香港獨立媒體 - Comments for "《中大學生報》在鼓吹什麼？"

誤會

YT的回應 "Second Reply to 任我行 (as well as ramad and 2006)"，大致上是爭論到底應該以哪個角度理解ａ＆ｂ兩個 cases，YT 理解遇到困難，我認為那是因為他仍未發覺彼此的討論焦點不同。

問題是 SR 這個詞有理解的分岐，導致雙方以為大家討論的焦點一致。應該以何種角度理解，視乎討論的焦點是什麼，如果雙方都認為要討論 YT 關注的一套判決準則，那以 YT 的角度理解會比較合理；可是現在的情況是，雙方的焦點有分岐。其實 2006 已經清楚的澄清，但 YT 仍然以為 2006 要爭論該以哪個角度理解 A&B，那是因為 YT 還沒有發覺彼此討論的焦點不同，所用的角度自然也不同。也就是說，如果雙方對想討論的焦點沒有共識的話，「爭論到底應該以哪個角度理解」其實可以還原為「我們應該討論什麼東西」。

YT 的論証值不值得討論，我不敢妄下斷言，不過我認為，與 2006 討論不會達到 YT 理想中的目的，除非 2006 願意在辯論中 roleplay 成 YT 所形容的 lovers of freedom，讓 YT 發揮他的 internal critique。

希望 YT 能夠化解溝通上的誤會，重整論証並且深化討論。

PS. YT 提問怎樣分辨 SR，直接引述 2006 的說明：

//(理由）必須不能只是個人的主觀感受，而需要提出合理的證據（經驗事實，即真的被人騷擾），以及由這些證據所合理推導出來的受到的傷害，以及這些傷害的不合理不道德的地方。這些理由，原則上必須有其客觀性，能夠被人理解，接受，又或批評。換言之，[b]是可以被Objectively Examined[/b] 的。//

即是說，可以被 objectively examined 的理由就不稱為 SR。這亦間接回答了「SR 是指理由的性質－－這個說法是什麼意思」的提問。

Second Reply to 任我行 (as well as ramad and 2006)

Let me collect at the outset a few representative statements from all three participants on a point I need the utmost to clarify.

ramad: "換言之，YT 混淆了 SR 是一套判決的準則，而SR其實是理由的性質，如果從理由的性質這個角度看 A&B，就未必可以炒埋一碟了。" ("溝通的分岐," supra)

任我行: "但YT一直將SR當做Deference，其實Deference只係邊一個有最後話事權，同個D理由既性質主唔主觀，根本係兩回事。" ("Ramad 說得好," supra)

2006: "YT一直以為A的觀點代表SR，而對我來說，B才是SR，即我說的主觀感受論，亦即：「是這樣的一種觀點：在任何道德爭論中，一個人的主觀感受，足以構成道德譴責的充份條件。」我上次的回應，正正要指出，立場（A）根本和SR（即B)沒有任何必然關係。而B關心的，則是理由的性質，和Deference沒有關係。" ("補充," supra)

And what are (A) and (B)? Here we restate them in 2006's own words ("回應YT 7," supra):
(A) "在性騷擾的案子中，被騷擾者所提出的理由，是判斷整個事件的充份理由，又或唯一需要考慮的因素。[...] 這裡的重點，嚴格來說，不是當事人提出的理由的性質（不理主觀或客觀），而是在整個判斷中，當事人提出的理由，被視為唯一的壓倒性的理由，並必須被聽從。"
(B) "在性騷擾的案子中，被騷擾者所提出的主觀感受，是道德譴責的唯一及充份理由。"

To all these I answer:

It is, first of all, very hard for me to make sense of this assertion by ramad, that "SR其實是理由的性質." What can this assertion mean exactly? If I take 2006's comment on (A) above, then "理由的性質" refers to whether a reason is subjective or objective. So, ordinarily we say, "I do X because I feel like it" is a subjective reason, and "I do Y because Y is a just thing to do" is an objective reason. So far so good. But what is SR? By it I meant, and still mean, the belief that "subjective resentment is a sufficient ground for moral condemnation." (See my Fourth Reply to 2006, supra, where I first used the abbreviation SR). I think it is clear from the very beginning that I mean a "判決的準則": How ought we to judge. (Cf. my Second Reply to 2006, supra, where it is plain that I always intend SR to be a criterion of judgment.)

I have great difficulty in understanding what ramad could mean by saying that SR "actually" is about "理由的性質." If ramad meant that when 2006, as an observer, judged whether what I did to a woman constituted sexual harassment, the sort of reason 2006 had to consider turned out to be subjective, namely, the woman's feeling; then ramad would still have to tell 2006--and any interpretation of SR must therefore be able to suggest--how he OUGHT TO ACT on that "subjective reason" proposed by the woman.

All three participants seem to be using the phrase "理由的性質" to indicate WHAT KIND of reason the observer ought to consider, but not HOW he ought to consider it. When, however, feminists, or lovers of freedom for that matter, advocated that we ought to move away from the reasonable person standard and make the woman's subjective perception decisive, they clearly did not mean simply that we ought to focus only on the woman's subjective perception. For if we are made only to focus on that, we may still, openly, retain the reasonable person standard; we may, that is, say to the victim: "Now, ma'am, I am going to consider ONLY your feelings (2006's (A): "唯一需要考慮的因素"); but I remain entirely free to apply a reasonable person standard in assessing those feelings." How would this be different from the treatment of sexual harassment cases in the good old "infamous" days then? The feminists' fight would be entirely pointless, if at the end they meant only to make feelings the only reason to CONSIDER. Pointless, let me repeat, not because it is irrational or unreasonable, but because under the said interpretation of SR the LsF would be advocating NOTHING at all.

What is at stake is not WHAT to consider, but HOW. In 2006's own words, what matters is whether the victim's feelings, or justification of those feelings, "必須被聽從." It is plain that I am entitled to regard (A)--"必須被聽從"--as a fair formulation of what I take SR to be.

How about (B) then? 2006's formulation: ""在性騷擾的案子中，被騷擾者所提出的主觀感受，是道德譴責的唯一及充份理由。" Let me focus on this last phrase: "唯一及充份理由." What can this phrase mean? If "被騷擾者所提出的主觀感受" is a "充份理由," can the observer REJECT the reason the victim proposed? 2006, 任我行, and ramad seem to believe that he can. For them, "充份理由" means:

(P1) If the observer finds subjective resentment, then he is entitled to condemn the act.

But here is the rub: What does "finds" here mean? Suppose the victim says in plain language: "I resent the act." The observer, on my reading of SR, is bound to "find" subjective resentment, and, if SR be adopted, to condemn the act. But (P1)--what 2006, 任我行, and ramad seem to take SR to mean--allows the observer not to find subjective resentment, DESPITE the victim's clear statement "I resent."

Does SR mean (P1)? On the face of it, it might. But if the observer is left entirely free to decide whether the victim resents the act, despite clear protestation from her, then we should probably say, not that the victim's subjective resentment is sufficient for moral condemnation--which is SR--but that the observer's (under what standard we know not) finding subjective resentment is sufficient etc.

Now, let us ask the question: How should we describe the situation where the observer refuses to find subjective resentment, despite clear protestation from the victim? We are bound to say, that the observer's ruling means to answer only the question: "Shall I find subjective resentment in this case?" but not the question: "Is there really subjective resentment here?"

Yet in plain language SR makes the EXISTENTIAL SITUATION "There is subjective resentment here", rather than the observer's independent assessment "I am willing to find subjective resentment," the sufficient condition for moral condemnation. Otherwise expressed: SR compels the observer to find in a certain manner, and it is NOT the case that it only compels the observer to come to a particular conclusion after he has done his finding in some unspecified way. I claim, therefore, that DEFERENCE is the key element: It is the victim's subjective resentment, not the observer's willingness to find subjective resentment, that determines the case: under this plain language interpretation of SR, the observer MUST DEFER: and it is indeed this that the LsF have long been advocating. Replacing the existential assertion by an independent assessment is the way in which 2006 repeatedly tries to "objectivize" SR, to make it sound like a standard where the observer has ample room to assess the victim's report as he likes. I object to that reading.

To my way of thinking, therefore, (A) "必須被聽從" and (B) "充份理由" give rise to the SAME standard of moral judgment. But since (A) and (B), on this argument, come down to the same thing, I fail completely to see why "即使我們接受(A)，也並不一定要接受(B)。" (2006, "回應YT 7," supra) 2006 and other participants can perhaps offer us a concrete hypothetical where (A) is said to be accepted, but (B) not, and show us how that hypothetical is different from one where both (A) and (B) are said to be accepted. Only then can readers have a chance to assess whether 2006's ehthusiastic attempt to distinguish (A) and (B) makes sense at all.

A Reply to 任我行 (with a long note on 2006's picture of moral disc

It seems that I am trying the patience of 任我行, which is not what I intended. But there is something particularly disturbing in what he said in the last reply, to which I think I must write an answer.

"你自己hold既三種觀點，我覺得2006一早就接受了，前面亦都重覆左好多次。用我之前既講法，呢場討論如果只係退回到拗你講既三點，豈不是有點trivial？2006唔想停係呢個位，而係要指出你撈亂了A 同B，而佢同時覺得A同B都唔合理，我覺得成場討論，呢個部份才最好玩最有哲學價值，而且對依家既學生報辯論最有啟發性。2006話佢講果種思維結構才合理，又提出一大堆理由，YT唔指出佢既唸法有無錯，又唔肯入去對話,只係話呢個係佢既個人觀點，咁樣對2006真係唔係幾公平。" And towards the end of the reply: "公平D講，2006好想將場討論，扯到一個更哲學更深入既層面來傾，YT卻為了點都唔肯從自己最初既立場退，別人回應了X，再提出Y，回應了Y，再提出Z，一路回應一路不得不退回原點，真係有D為辯而辯Feel。"

If "2006一早就接受了" the three points I proposed--and in especial the second one--then I have reason to believe that 2006 completely accepts the validity of my INTERNAL CRITIQUE of the lovers of freedom (LsF). That critique takes the following form: I argued (a) that the LsF accepted C (standing for some proposition); but (b) that accepting C, they ought also to accept D; yet (c) that they seem not to accept D; therefore (d) that they owe us an explanation why they think they can do so consistently.

Whether this is a trivial argument, 任我行 can form his own judgment. But if 2006 tries to counter this argument by saying that C is wrong, impossible, unreasonable, irrational, or what not, then even if all these things are "最好玩最有哲學價值," lying on "一個更哲學更深入既層面," 任我行 ought not to demand that I follow 2006 to discourse on all these things, BEFORE 2006 declares clearly (i) that he has no dispute with the validity of my internal critique, as laid out above, and (ii) that by discoursing on those things we are engaging in a DIFFERENT debate.

"2006唔想停係呢個位，而係要指出你撈亂了A 同B，而佢同時覺得A同B都唔合理." Tell me, 任我行, what has any of these assertions by 2006 to do with the validity of my internal critique? At this point 任我行 quoted this bit from 2006: "一旦接受以上所說，即將YT當初設定的Assumption ONE打破，我們便可以鬆開YT的整個論證，從而容許在學生報的爭論中，不同的理由，都可以被考慮進來" But what does it mean to say "將YT當初設定的Assumption ONE打破"? 2006 meant to say, I take it, that he could demonstrate the irrationality or unreasonableness of C in the schema above. But what has this to do with the VALIDITY of the critique itself? None at all.

Suppose I say the following: "The LsF believed that 2 + 3 gives 6, and that addition is a commutative operation. They must therefore also believe that 3 + 2 gives 6." Now 2006 comes along and say: "But 2 + 3 does not give 6! Reasonable people ought not to believe in this!" Isn't this completely beside the point? Perhaps 2006 would "話佢講果種思維結構才合理，又提出一大堆理由"; why should I not insist that all that he said is only his personal opinion, completely irrelevant to the critique? (NB: 2006 might say: "I mean to offer a way out for the LsF: they need not, in fact ought not to, accept C!" But Arnold has long ago observed that 2006 could not achieve that simply by invoking such notions as "rational" or "reasonable." See, supra, Arnold, "理性者是否一定不會接納主觀感受論？" 2006 is, I gather, very much trapped by his rather theoretical approach to my internal critique. His notion of "進行道德思考的普遍性的思維結構"--see his "回應YT 7," supra--gives the picture of a setting where almost anything could be put on the table. What is missing from that picture is the sorts of CRITERION OF JUDGMENT participants would urge others to adopt. So, e.g., M might say to N: "Let us defer to each person's own judgment, when it comes to what is best for him or her." In this case, M proposes a subjective standard, very much in the spirit of SR: For once H, say, says that an apple is best for him, all other participants ought, under M's standard, to accept that an apple is best for H. 2006's picture fails to describe this crucial aspect of moral discourse; for him there are only reasons (subjective or objective), but no criteria.)

There is one, and only one, interpretation of 2006's whole argumentative strategy which might render it not entirely irrelevant. Which is this: that he meant to argue, that what the LsF advocate is, as a matter of fact, not a subjective standard (of moral judgment in my sense of SR), but necessarily something different; for instance, that we ought to be allowed to challenge a sexual harassment victim's subjective feelings by a reasonable person standard. I think I have good reason to declare that this argumentative strategy equally does not work; but let me relegate my answer to a subsequent post.

補充

謝謝YT, Arnold, 任我行及Ramad的回應。

我寫完總結，自以為已將問題表達得好清楚，所以讀到YT的總結，的確不明白為什麼還會有誤解的地方。剛才讀到Ramad的回應，才恍然大悟。原來YT和我有個好大誤會。

YT說：「Let me now come to your (A) and (B). On (A) you said: "這裡的重點，嚴格來說，不是當事人提出的理由的性質（不理主觀或客觀），而是在整個判斷中，當事人提出的理由，被視為唯一的壓倒性的理由，並必須被聽從。" This is a fair formulation of the subjective standard, or SR. 」

YT一直以為A的觀點代表SR，而對我來說，B才是SR，即我說的主觀感受論，亦即：「是這樣的一種觀點：在任何道德爭論中，一個人的主觀感受，足以構成道德譴責的充份條件。」

我上次的回應，正正要指出，立場（A）根本和SR（即B)沒有任何必然關係。而B關心的，則是理由的性質，和Deference沒有關係。

Ramad說：「YT 認為應該以 deference 去理解何謂 SR，但問題是 SR 是指理由的性質，與 deference 搭不上邊。」

這的確是我的意思。我之前以為SR是指涉理由的性質這一點，大家早已有共識。直至看到Ramad的留言，我才留意到，YT原來並不這樣看。這真是另一個不美麗的誤會。

補充這一點，供各位參考。

Ramad 說得好

Ramad，你呢次講得真係好準好應，將YT既一個重要盲點指了出來。SR的確係指理由既性質，呢一點2006其實講左好多次，我估Arnold同我亦都有同樣觀察，但YT一直將SR當做Deference，其實Deference只係邊一個有最後話事權，同個D理由既性質主唔主觀，根本係兩回事。2006最後果篇回應，分開A同B，然後指出兩樣指既係唔同既野，我覺得問題已經好清楚。

所以，我唸極都唔明點解YT會見唔到呢個分別，定係佢見到但唔肯退。所以你話「YT 混淆了 SR 是一套判決的準則，而SR其實是理由的性質，如果從理由的性質這個角度看 A&B，就未必可以炒埋一碟了。」真係好到point。

其實呢個point一清楚，成個Debate既脈絡便清楚晒。YT果三個Empirical Points，根本唔係要拗既重點。

溝通的分岐

任我行的分析很好
我又口痕，嘗試從 YT 的角度看問題

//Let me now come to your (A) and (B). On (A) you said: "這裡的重點，嚴格來說，不是當事人提出的理由的性質（不理主觀或客觀），而是在整個判斷中，當事人提出的理由，被視為唯一的壓倒性的理由，並必須被聽從。" This is a fair formulation of the subjective standard, or SR.//

這是否分岐所在呢？
YT 似乎認為，「當事人提出的理由，被視為唯一的壓倒性的理由，並必須被聽從。」即是 SR，所以才會將 A&B 放在一起。

//I tried to explicate why the notion of DEFERENCE is key to understanding SR, and the giving of reasons is NOT.//

YT 認為應該以 deference 去理解何謂 SR，但問題是 SR 是指理由的性質，與 deference 搭不上邊。YT 想討論的應該是判決的準則，所以才會一再的使用 subjective standard 這個字眼。如果以YT形容的 "subjective standard"的判決標準這個角度來看 A&B (或是叫 victim-centralized standard(tm) =P )，就不難理解為何 YT 會將兩者放在一起了。換言之，YT 混淆了 SR 是一套判決的準則，而SR其實是理由的性質，如果從理由的性質這個角度看 A&B，就未必可以炒埋一碟了。

再者 YT 也沒有證明，有很多 lovers of freedom 認同 A or B；就如任我行所說， YT 的三個 claims 顯得不實在。

希望我無誤解，也期待兩位會將討論深化。

再加句口

睇完YT既總結，真係忍唔住加多句。

坦白講句，作為觀戰者，我真係覺得YT有點兒為辯而辯既味道了。你自己hold既三種觀點，我覺得2006一早就接受了，前面亦都重覆左好多次。用我之前既講法，呢場討論如果只係退回到拗你講既三點，豈不是有點trivial？

2006唔想停係呢個位，而係要指出你撈亂了A 同B，而佢同時覺得A同B都唔合理，我覺得成場討論，呢個部份才最好玩最有哲學價值，而且對依家既學生報辯論最有啟發性。2006話佢講果種思維結構才合理，又提出一大堆理由，YT唔指出佢既唸法有無錯，又唔肯入去對話,只係話呢個係佢既個人觀點，咁樣對2006真係唔係幾公平。我唔係好明點解你唔肯行前一步,去認真檢討A同B係唔係合理呢個問題。我都同意2006同Arnold既觀察,你真係將A同B撈埋一碟了,而且撈得好有問題,但你既總結好似仲唔肯承認呢個大問題。

我估你會話呢個同你最初既立場無關,所以你唔想拗。但你似乎到現在都睇唔到2006既用心,雖然佢係佢既總結都講得好清楚。費事屈佢,用佢自己既話:

'一旦接受以上所說，即將YT當初設定的Assumption ONE打破，我們便可以鬆開YT的整個論證，從而容許在學生報的爭論中，不同的理由，都可以被考慮進來'

我估2006係話,如果A同B唔成立,就算你強調個三點係事實同邏輯上可能,都唔再重要,因為你講個D lovers of freedom根本唔需要跟你個套來為學生報辯護。咁即係就算你唔係打緊稻草人,個問題重點都唔再係個度,因為仲有大把其他角度去唸成件事。

唉,呢個先至係2006既用心吧。2006呢個目的,連我呢個旁觀者都睇到清清楚楚,YT你無理由睇唔到卦? 如果成場咁好玩既討論,最後只係退到一個無人會否認既你果三個trivial points,豈不是無趣之極?

公平D講，2006好想將場討論，扯到一個更哲學更深入既層面來傾，YT卻為了點都唔肯從自己最初既立場退，別人回應了X，再提出Y，回應了Y，再提出Z，一路回應一路不得不退回原點，真係有D為辯而辯Feel。

唉! 我都覺得唔值得再拗下去。直了點，有怪莫怪。

Seventh Reply to 2006: 爭論的到底是什麼？ [Debate adjourned]

Thank you again for your very patient and careful replies. I shall be most brief this time. There are, I believe, three major stumbling blocks to your way of approaching my argument, instanced in this passage of yours:

"基於此，我說反對學生報情色版的朋友，不能只以「感到不安」作為充分理由來譴責學生報。他們必須進一步，提出感到不安的理由，然後我們再具體檢驗這些理由是否成立。同樣道理，在性騷擾的例子中，我們也不能僅僅以「被騷擾者是否主觀心理上感到被侮辱」來作為道德及法律判決的唯一因素，我們必須追問導致這種被侮辱的感受的來源是否合理，是否基於false belief等。"

Essentially you said, that it could not be rational or reasonable to adopt SR. To which I say three things: (1) The law does sometimes adopt a subjective standard of liability; (2) Many feminists do tend to advocate a rather subjective standard in matters of sexual harassment; (3) That SR seems irrational or unreasonable to you does not mean that people cannot hold it. (1) and (2) are empirical claims, and (3) is a logical claim.

Let me now come to your (A) and (B). On (A) you said: "這裡的重點，嚴格來說，不是當事人提出的理由的性質（不理主觀或客觀），而是在整個判斷中，當事人提出的理由，被視為唯一的壓倒性的理由，並必須被聽從。" This is a fair formulation of the subjective standard, or SR. Then on (B) you said: "我上面已指出，被騷擾者提出的理由，（如果要被他人接受），便必須不能只是個人的主觀感受，而需要提出合理的證據（經驗事實，即真的被人騷擾），以及由這些證據所合理推導出來的受到的傷害，以及這些傷害的不合理不道德的地方。" The key sentence is this: "(如果要被他人接受），便必須不能只是個人的主觀感受，而需要提出合理的證據 [...]" I already allowed that even if a subjective standard be adopted, the victim of course still has to prove that there was such an act, etc. (See my Reply to Arnold, pt.2, supra) But once we focus on whether the victim be the sole judge (to whom others must defer) of the act's being an act of harassment or not, a subjective standard would say that she is, and an objective one not. By writing the sentence just quoted, you deliberately moved from a subjective to an objective standard ("必須不能只是個人的主觀感受"), which of course is not what (B) ought to say, it being, in your words: "在性騷擾的案子中，被騷擾者所提出的主觀感受，是道德譴責的唯一及充份理由。" Your explication of (B) diverges from (B)'s true meaning; it is this, I believe, which made you think that there is a logical gap between (A) and (B), when in fact such a gap exists only between (A) and (B) on the one hand, and your explication of (B) on the other hand.

Lastly, I observe that you are inclined to discourse on whether you yourself accept (A) and (B). Hence: "而我一直要爭論的，其實是(B)是否合理"; "至於(A)，我自己也有保留"; "換言之，我既不同意A，也不同意B。" I take it that you meant to say, that (A) and (B) are normatively problematic. But that is beside the point. Go back to the stumbling blocks: none of the three statements, which are crucial to my whole argument, stands or falls with your PERSONAL OPINION on (A) and (B). You might, of course, dispute the three statements, as empirical and logical claims respectively; but your personal opinion on (A) and (B) must remain immaterial.

I sense that you are often tempted to make two moves in representing my argument: (I) to articulate the subjective standard in such a way that what you eventually give is really an objective one; (II) to conflate what other people might be found to accept, or appear to accept, with what you yourself might find to be acceptable. Let me end my comments here, and, if you agree, adjourn the debate until Arnold returns. In the interim, you may of course answer this Seventh Reply; but I shall save my further replies, if any, till that date. Thank you very much. My best regards.

答Arnold

Arnold，對，你這樣的表述，更加清楚一點，亦能更清楚點出，為什麼我既不接受B，也不接受A。
謝謝！

YT和2006的分歧

很欣賞2006的澄清，但請2006再說明以下一點(抱歉不斷插嘴)：

YT說:"both (1) and (2) involve the giving of reasons; but this general description precisely fails to represent what I take to be the crucial difference here, namely, that (2) involves an act of deference to WHATEVER the victim is going to put forward AS reason."

2006說：「YT真正要爭拗的......是為什麼被性騷擾者的理由，可以有那樣的壟斷性的位置。」

我發現2006所謂「被性騷擾者的理由」，在YT口中則是"WHATEVER the victim is going to put forward AS reason"，二者明顯不同。所以我會寧願把2006對YT的理解修正為：

「YT真正要爭拗的......是為什麼被性騷擾者的個人判斷，不論是否合理，都可以有那樣的壟斷性位置。」不知YT和2006可會同意？

本來我還有其他看法，可惜身有要務，實在要先行告退。今天看不到結果，要到下週六才能有空上網觀戰，相信到時大家應已鳴金收兵了吧？期待YT或2006屆時可另闢戰線，謝謝兩位這場有趣的辯論！

回應YT 7: 爭論的到底是什麼？

謝謝YT及其餘幾位精警而有見地的回應。看來真有點欲罷不能。時間及精力所限，恕我不逐一回應了。我重看了一次整個討論，發覺我和YT都有誤讀對方的地方。我希望以下總結，能夠將我所理解的爭論重點呈現出來。

我一直要反對的，是這樣的一種觀點：「在任何道德爭論中，一個人的主觀感受，足以構成道德譴責的充份條件。」

我認為這種觀點根本不成立。這和我對實踐理性的理解有關。在道德爭論中，爭論雙方一定會提出不同的理由，去支持自己的立場，並希望對方被說服。這些理由，可以有不同性質，其中也包括各人對事件的感受。但如果雙方都願意講道理，他們所提出的理由，必然不能只限於個人的主觀感受，而必須假定這些理由是能從一impartial/inter-subjective的觀點，對話者是能夠理解，分享，甚至接受的。(事實上會否接受，那是另一回事。) In short, personal subjective feeling AS SUCH cannot be the sufficient condition of moral condemnation.

基於此，我說反對學生報情色版的朋友，不能只以「感到不安」作為充分理由來譴責學生報。他們必須進一步，提出感到不安的理由，然後我們再具體檢驗這些理由是否成立。同樣道理，在性騷擾的例子中，我們也不能僅僅以「被騷擾者是否主觀心理上感到被侮辱」來作為道德及法律判決的唯一因素，我們必須追問導致這種被侮辱的感受的來源是否合理，是否基於false belief等。

一旦我們追問理由是否成立，便意味著這些理由的成立與否，必須相應於一個獨立於當事人的主觀感受的標準，這個標準遂成為判斷對錯的客觀根據。所以，我並不同意YT在上面所說的第二種情形，即“your feeling bad is SUFFICIENT for me to acknowledge your victimhood, the nature of your reason being for me immaterial."　我之前已用了不少例子，說明這個說法，並不合理。此處不贅。

我認為，這是我們平時每個人進行道德思考的普遍性的思維結構。這個結構適用於所有人，而不限於lovers of freedom，又或那一種特定的情況。我在討論中，加上 “reasonable and rational”，純粹是避免一種情況，即那些一開始便不願意講道理的人，即那些永遠只停留於個人感受，卻無法也不願意替自己的感受作進一步辯護的人。這是一個非常單薄的弱的理性要求，我一直假定大家都會接受。而我在上一次，亦已指出這不是tautology。換言之，爭論的重點，不在於reasonable & rational，而在於各位是否同意我所描述的思維結構。

如果我所說的思維結構成立，那我們便可以推出以下結論：在任何道德爭論中，爭論雙方都可以，也應該提出不同種類不同性質但與事件相關的理由，去為自己的立場辯護。在學生報的例子中，正方可以提出言論自由，對性議題的獨特看法，對大學教育的理解，對傷害原則的詮釋等，反方同樣可以用社會道德規範，大學生的形象，正常的性關係性觀念該如何，宗教教條等等提出反駁。

我們沒有既定的答案。我們只能在不斷的公開的理性討論中，檢視及衡量不同理由的合理性相關性，慢慢將一些錯誤的不相干的或不重要的理由排除，然後努力嘗試作出合理的判斷。（當然不一定有共識）我們不能說，在爭論過程中，有那一個人，或有那一類的理由，先驗地具有優先性。我想，這是常識，也是目前學生報爭論的實際情況。

（一旦接受以上所說，即將YT當初設定的Assumption ONE打破，我們便可以鬆開YT的整個論證，從而容許在學生報的爭論中，不同的理由，都可以被考慮進來，包括freedom of speech。當然，Freedom of Speech只是其中一個理由，既不是唯一，也不一定是凌駕性的理由。Freedom of Speech本身也是一個道德理由。這一點，我在回應Ramad時已點了出來，任我行也看出了我的用心。）

以上是我的立場！

清楚我的立場，便清楚我為什麼反對主觀感受論。對我來說，問題不在於，事實上有多少人相信SR，而在於我根本不接受SR是一種站得住腳的觀點（不同意者當然可以提出理由反駁）。我並不否認現實中有不少人真的以為SR是合理的，而其中有不少是錯誤地理解自己的實踐理性思考的結構的。所以，在這一點上，我和YT並沒太大差異。如果他要指出有不少相信SR的人，持雙重標準，那我並沒意見──雖然我並不相信有什麼願意說道理的freedom of lovers會真的接受我上面所形容的主觀感受論。

有趣的是，我以上的觀點，原來根本不是YT要關心，甚至有什麼異議的。他的關注點似乎不在這裡。真正的問題在於什麼地方呢？先看看YT自己的說法：

「It is, I hope, very plain that (1) and (2) are two very different ways of assessing the situation. Of course, one might say--and 2006 would likely say--that both (1) and (2) involve the giving of reasons; but this general description precisely fails to represent what I take to be the crucial difference here, namely, that (2) involves an act of deference to WHATEVER the victim is going to put forward AS reason. (NB: To see why the difference is crucial, it is enough to recall 2006's emphasis on whether the alleged victim's feelings are based on true beliefs. If we adopt (1), this is of course a factor decisive; but if we adopt (2), it is altogether immaterial. Now transpose this thought structure to the case of the Student Press, where, we may fancy, some sexually conservative students protest that the publications offended their feelings deeply.)」

我首先須承認，YT已經重覆表述了這個觀點好幾次，而我的確忽略了他的用心所在。我先此致歉。但YT這個論點，有兩大問題。一，他將兩個不同的問題，混了在一起，又或以為兩者沒有分別。二，這兩個問題的立場，我認為都不成立。
讓我沿用性騷擾作為例子，呈現這兩個問題。

A. 在性騷擾的案子中，被騷擾者所提出的理由，是判斷整個事件的充份理由，又或唯一需要考慮的因素。（用YT之前的說法，the victim's subjective resentment is all that is needed for condemnation.）這裡的重點，嚴格來說，不是當事人提出的理由的性質（不理主觀或客觀），而是在整個判斷中，當事人提出的理由，被視為唯一的壓倒性的理由，並必須被聽從。重點在於哪一個人有發言權，而不在該種理由的性質及其是否成立。YT真正持的，是這個觀點，所以他說：“2006 ought to confront the substance of the hypothetical, by way of which I tried to explicate why the notion of DEFERENCE is key to understanding SR, and the giving of reasons is NOT.”

B. 在性騷擾的案子中，被騷擾者所提出的主觀感受，是道德譴責的唯一及充份理由。

很不幸，在整個討論中，這兩個問題，YT將它們混在一起了。而這兩個，明顯是不同的問題。因為即使我們接受(A)，也並不一定要接受(B)。兩者沒有任何必然關係。我上面已指出，被騷擾者提出的理由，（如果要被他人接受），便必須不能只是個人的主觀感受，而需要提出合理的證據（經驗事實，即真的被人騷擾），以及由這些證據所合理推導出來的受到的傷害，以及這些傷害的不合理不道德的地方。這些理由，原則上必須有其客觀性，能夠被人理解，接受，又或批評。換言之，是可以被Objectively Examined 的。所以，YT筆下的Lovers of Freedom or Feminists，即使接受A,也不一定/不需要，而且也不應該接受B。

有趣的是，YT卻一直認為，接受（A）便必須接受(B)，所以他才會說：

「2) "Well, ma'am, I might or might not find your so-called reason a reasonable thought; but in cases of this sort, I (perhaps being a feminist) shall DEFER to your judgment; and since I do find the act of such a kind, that I shall defer to your judgment, your feeling bad is SUFFICIENT for me to acknowledge your victimhood, the nature of your reason being for me immaterial."」

我並不認為A和B有這樣的涵蘊關係。而到目前為止，YT亦似乎沒有提出什麼有力理由來證成這點。（退一步，即使他成功證成了這點，但由於B本身是錯的，Freedom of Lovers也不應接受B。)

由此可見，YT真正要爭拗的，其實不是SR本身的合理性與否，而是質疑為什麼在事件中，被性騷擾者本人持有的理由，不論合理與否，都可以有那樣壟斷性的位置，凌駕其他考慮。而對於這點，我沒有異議。而我一直要爭論的，其實是(B)是否合理（雖然我也回應了A）。這真是一個不太美麗的誤會。

至於(A)，我自己也有保留。我並不認為，即使像在性騷擾的例子中，被騷擾者的證供（主觀感受或客觀理由）是唯一的凌駕性的理由，因為這些證供，是有機會源於False Belief or Simply Misunderstanding等等。我之前的辦公室男女大衛像T恤的例子已說明這點。(對於YT對性騷擾案例的描述，及將其和學生報的爭論作直接類比，我也有保留，但此非我關心的重點，這裡不論。）

換言之，我既不同意A，也不同意B。希望這次回應，能為這次爭論，作一個較為清楚的總結。

A Side Reply to Arnold and ramad

I think Arnold saw the rub of my argument this time and represented it fairly, though a little too technically. But one point remains which I should very much like to clarify. If we look back to my earlist reply to 2006, I did not characterize what I later called SR as rational or irrational, reasonable or unreasonable: those terms were introduced into this debate by 2006.

I concede that 2006 wanted to make a meaningful argument through those terms; but one manifest drawback, and here I speak with the benefit of hindsight, is that the thought structure of "objective vs. subjective standard of moral judgment" is surreptitiously replaced by the thought structure of "rational/reasonable vs. irrational/unreasonable commentators." 2006 thus gives the impression that I meant merely to prove that many commentators--the "lovers of freedom"--are, in his sense, irrational and unreasonable. An internal critique is at one stroke replaced by an external one.

But that is far from my purpose (and so despite Arnold's characterization: "他的質疑相信僅是指向理性的程度，而非全盤否定." See, supra "理性者是否一定不會接納主觀感受論？") I did not set out to prove that the lovers of freedom are irrational or unreasonable; but that if they elect to promote a very subjective standard in matters of sexual harassment, they ought to tell us why do they now demand a much more objective one respecting complaints against the Student Press.

I suggest that we move away from the "rational vs. irrational" debate. In fact, 2006 himself might very well endorse a subjective standard in the law of sexual harassment, thus IN THAT SENSE coming under my general rubric of "lovers of freedom." He might do this rationally, by giving us an account why he believes that a subjective standard is to be preferred. Sticking to the vocabulary 2006 introduced in his "回應YT 2" will only obscure what, to my way of thinking, is really at stake.

I apologize that I failed to notice this earlier. Otherwise I could have saved a lot of ink, and avoided many unnecessary confusion-causing excurses. I hope by putting my whole argument this way, I have also answered ramad's contentions in his latest reply, entitled "YT."

YT

//2.理性的人(reasonable and rational)本質上(即YT所謂 "essentially"，"in a non-accidental way")不會接受SR論；//

2006 沒有說過不會，他承認有這樣的人在，只是認為數目很少，也沒有辦法改變他們。

YT 想講，好多人以 SR 嚟碌卡，但一有利益不符，就過橋抽板；2006 根本沒有否認這個現象，他所說的是：

//只要將他們真正持有的道德論證鋪陳出來，他們自然會看到其道德判斷的真正理由所在，從而放棄SR。//

YT 若然能夠揭示他們如何一時一樣，那很好，你已經將了軍，將死了，不過你的對手不是 2006，他是在解局而已。

回 Arnold

唔，我 get 到你意思了

你認為學生要挑戰言論自由的界線，我不同意這個講法。學生挑戰的禁忌，所指的應該是性禁忌。如果有人「突破」言論自由界線（我猜意思是連自己都認同，所行使的言論自由嚴重 override 其他價值，不值得專重，例如鼓吹兒童色情），而又用言論自由抗辯，是太明顯的 self-defeating 了，只有少數人會這麼做，就如 2006 所解釋的是 irrational & unreasonable 的人。如果學生不是這種人，那麼比較上可能的情況是：當事人認為所行使的言論自由，即使有 override 其他價值，也是合理的，值得專重；那麼以言論自由抗辯並不是不合理。

至於實際上有沒有出界，也是需要合理理由支持的，現在情況是，社會跳過了討論程序，直接就給學生懲罰了；在這個層面，也可以從 freedom of speech 著手爭取抗辯的機會。

理性者是否一定不會接納主觀感受論？

原來大家的焦點不同，難怪，不如讓我們把戰場收窄吧。

YT要2006重點回應的是Fifth Reply to him, pt. 2：

You wrote: "當被騷擾者提出這些理由時，她是相信這些是有客觀性，同時別人會合理接受的，而不是她個人的主觀感受而已。" On what ground can you say, that "同時別人會合理接受"? Suppose I did something to a woman, and she alleged that I harassed her sexually. She and I, and you as the observer, all accepted that dignity is an objective value, to be honored and protected.

But she and I disagreed over whether this particular act of mine violated her dignity in a sexual way. If you declared that the woman's SUBJECTIVE belief, that the act was indeed an instance of dignity violation, could not be challenged by my appeal to, say, a reasonable person standard ("A reasonable woman in her situation would not have found the act an instance of dignity violation."), then you essentially accepted SR.

但我認為2006不是沒有嘗試回應這部分的，只是他的回應未能說服YT。讓我綜合一下2006的答案吧：

1.lovers of freedom(應包括了YT關注的feminists)是理性的人(至少大部分)；

2.理性的人(reasonable and rational)本質上(即YT所謂 "essentially"，"in a non-accidental way")不會接受SR論；

3.所以lovers of freedom本質上不會接受SR論。

為什麼2006滿足不到YT？因為YT竭力要訴諸的，是"a reasonable person standard" ("A reasonable woman in her situation would not have found the act an instance of dignity violation.")而非"SUBJECTIVE belief"，質疑的正是lovers of freedom沒有訴諸"a reasonable person standard"，但2006在minor premise中卻假設了lovers of freedom應是reasonable的(因為他們會提出「理由」來解釋其主觀感受)，問題是，如果2006的第一前提正正是YT質疑之處，那麼2006的確並沒具體答覆過YT。

但我想指出更重要的一點，如果2006真的像我上述般論證的話，YT已經勝利了。因為2006的major premise，即"理性的人(reasonable and rational)本質上不會接受SR論"根本不成立，或(退一步說)在現實上沒有意義。為什麼呢？因為:

(1)從"reasonable and rational"(描述人的本質)這兩字的定義，我們根本無由分析出"不會接受SR論"(描述人的偶性)這情況，所以在邏輯上講，2006誤會了這前提是analytic judgement(因為他試圖從概念出發分析「本質」)，但實際上它只是synthetic judgement(因為其謂語乃來自empirical induction)，根本沒有必然性，且完全是可以通過實際檢驗而被合理推翻的;

(2)所謂"本質上"不會接受，如果經院派一點來拆解，我會說：「那可以是潛能中的本質，根本沒有實現。所以lovers of freedom在現實世界可以同時有理性，又同時接受SR論，兩者並無矛盾。」換言之，即使我們撇開(1)的邏輯謬誤不談，結論中那「本質上」也不等同「現實上」，所以其結論的意義不大。

我的結論是，2006的論證本身存有漏洞，他有必要重新回應YT的Fifth Reply to him, pt. 2。

至於lovers of freedom本身是否理性的人(即minor premise的內涵)，我反而不會像YT般質疑－－他的質疑相信僅是指向理性的程度，而非全盤否定－－因為如果lovers of freedom全沒理性，按理也不可能在獨媒跟人討論問題，除非(我只是說除非)這裡的人也是同樣沒有理性吧。