"無論在理論或現實的層面，過去多種不同的說法已指出回歸並非殖民的結束，幾乎已成為了共識，問題是如何解釋殖民被延續的現象。圍繞在《殖民無間道》多篇文章的重要訊息就是提出考察殖民延續的角度，關鍵在於殖民的構成，作者不主張把焦點集中於西方帝國主義或霸權，反而著重中國民族主義歷史以及香港作為殖民城市的經驗，如何導致殖民意識的延伸." By "殖民被延續的現象" I take the reviewer to mean "殖民意識的延伸"; it is indeed in this sense that he allows himself to proclaim "回歸並非殖民的結束，幾乎已成為了共識"--"共識," let us say, within certain discursive circles. That the "consensus" lives within certain discursive circles is not itself a cause of concern; but to understand what that consensus amounts to--what it signifies, and how it comes to be--it may be useful to keep in mind this fact, that the consensus is a consensus with respect to these circles in which the author seems to dwell.

Suppose a writer claim that even in the Fifth Republic France remains an Empire; for the imperial sense has managed to maintain itself among the French ever since the days of Napoleon. Confronted with such a claim, we may as well look to the minds of the French, past and present, in search of that imperial sense; as question the writer, what he means in fact by "the imperial sense," in what ways he thinks it manifests itself, and under what conditions would he one day agree that that sense is finally no more.

Likewise we need to ask the author, as well as the reviewer, of "Re-theorizing Colonial Power," what in fact is this "colonial consciousness" ("殖民意識") that lies at the heart of the analysis. On the one hand, "consciousness" might be something so all-embracing that everything in a certain space and time must be "in it" and colored "by it"; it is, on the other hand, not particularly illuminating if so broad a conception of "consciousness" be accepted, and used to give content to the so-called "殖民意識的延伸."

The difficulty--not illegitimacy--with the notion of "colonial consciousness" may be further compared to that with the notion of "Cold-War mindset." It is not infrequent that we read in political commentaries that this and this is nothing but a continuation of the Cold-War mindset. But this and this can also be regarded as nothing more than the psychological reflection of rivalry between Great Powers. If this sort of rivalry is there to stay, which is likely, it would not be too laborious to discern in many a contentious exchange a "Cold-War mindset," and to claim that that mindset has managed to maintain itself despite the formal end of the Cold-War, etc. etc.

To approach the difficulty from a different angle: what we need to know, if we are to assess "殖民意識的延伸," is what "殖民意識" is not. It is tempting to take whatever effect British rule had for HK to be a component of this "殖民意識"; to direct our gaze to all the cultural activities during the colonial days; and, above all, to identify the ways in which a continuity may be said to exist, from then to now. But the "殖民意識" so found can mean only a "意識" formed in the "殖民" period, not necessarily a "意識" formed because, and only because, of "殖民." Just as not every phenomenon found during the Cold-War must be peculiar to the Cold-War, not every feature of the consciousness formed during the colonial days must be peculiar to colonial experience.

Once we concede this proposition last-mentioned, we must be prepared to revisit, and to limit, claims about "殖民意識的延伸"; for in the first place fewer things ought to be deemed consequences or manifestations of "colonial" rule, and, with fewer things to start with, less ought to be claimed for the continuity of "colonial" consciousness.

This is not a defence of colonial rule. But in the vogue of speaking of "the colonial" it may be refreshing to pause and see whether we are not too eager to expand the sway of that notion, at the risk of subsuming much that HK people have experienced in the past, to a description that is more telling about us--some of us--than about them.