Book Review: Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007
In the academic field, many scholars of Chinese studies and international relations are studying the various impacts of the rise of China. Will China upset the existing international norms and world order? Will the boom of Chinese economy threaten the economic growth and environmental condition of other countries? Will China challenge the American hegemony?
Indeed, Joshua Kurlantzick attempts to answer the above questions in his latest work - Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World.
At the very beginning of his book, Kurlantzick defines soft power from the Chinese perspective as “soft power means anything outside of the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations”, which is different from Joseph Nye’s values, ideals and norms.
Chinese government has paid more attention in building up its soft power, mainly because of the theory of “China Threat”, the concerns of economic and technological interdependencies between China and other countries, and the Chinese regional hegemonic interests. According to Kurlantzick, China would like to use “peaceful development” in order to replace or fade out the “China threat”; China would like to check the unilateral American moves by using its soft power rather than hard power (direct political and military confrontation) since China treasures its economic and technological interdependencies with the United States, Europe and Japan; China would also like to establish its influence in Southeast Asia through soft power, which can minimize the suspicions among Southeast Asian countries.
Kurlantzick carried out interviews and case studies about the rising Chinese influence in various developing countries. China sets up Confucians institutes from Kenya, South Korea, Uzbekistan to Australia; promotes Chinese language in Southeast Asian countries by offering wide range of scholarships and academic exchanges, provides diplomatic professional training to officials in many developing countries, builds up close relations with Chinese diaspora; gives economic aid and loans to poor countries for building economic infrastructures and social facilities; last but not least, encourages Chinese investment in developing countries for boosting their local economic development.
However, not all the Chinese influences can be regarded as good to others. Kurlantzick points out that China also exports labour, environmental and governance problems to others. Chinese firms often neglect the safety of workers and pay little salary to the local workers. In order to avoid labour strike, Chinese firms sometimes employ Chinese to replace the local workers. Besides, some Chinese firms launch illegal logging in Burma and Indonesia. Chinese government built dams on the upper course of Mekong River which have threatened the Cambodian fish stocks and fertilize arable lands in the lower course of the river. In addition, China tolerates authoritarian rule in Cambodia, Laos and Angola for its unconditional aids and loans while the World Bank and International Monetary Fund always demand the recipient countries to comply good governance. China is also criticized for its non-intervention policy in Darfur which finally caused humanitarian disaster.
Kurlantzick’s efforts should be given credit in figuring out the latest pattern and development of Chinese foreign policy. The qualitative works such as case studies and interviews with diplomats, business people and Chinese diaspora are also valuable to the study of Chinese foreign policy. However, as a student of international relations, I would expect a finer definition of the Chinese soft power rather than putting the Chinese political influence and economic capability under the category of soft power. Besides, since China has engaged with many regional institutions by advocating multilateralism, the power and influence of China can be explained in terms of structural realism or institutionalism, but not necessarily soft power. Moreover, Kurlantzick concludes that there are mutual interests between China and the United States, thus he holds an optimistic view that “if America seems popular and strong, allowing China to assume more responsibility for the globe will become easier for America to accept”. It seems that the conclusion simplifies the interactions and mechanisms between China and the United States in shaping the world order. The political significances and implications of the Chinese charm offensive towards the existing international norms and values as well as world order should be further examined. What is the role of Chinese norm of non-intervention and multilateralism in upsetting the status-quo or making the new world order? Does the Chinese soft power cause any political cost to the United States?
Nevertheless, Kurlantzick points out the determining pivot between the Chinese and American soft power, “More important, the United States still offers a political and social model, a set of values, which can appeal to average people around the world. China’s values – noninterference, respect for other nations’ internal affairs, economic gradualism directed by the state – can enjoy appeal. But China’s values appeal only to specific groups: elites in authoritarian nations…” Since the Deng’s era, the Chinese foreign policies are regarded as pragmatic in the quest of national interests, may be it is the time for the Chinese government to review its previous diplomacy by concerning more about international public interests.