Preface: As commentators have found the nature of a moral right, and in particular the moral right to revenge, somewhat unclear in my precedent expositions, by which were many confusions caused, regarding what I in fact was advocating; I am inclined to treat of the subject theoretically, without any intermittent references to specific examples, so that I may lay out my thoughts in as precise a manner as possible.
On the Nature of the Moral Right to Revenge
The moral right to revenge can be characterized by this one fundamental thought: The holder of a moral right to revenge - viz. every human being or group of human beings unjustifiably harmed, bodily or emotionally, by another human being or group of human beings - has a CLAIM that no spectator, present and future, can justifiably pass an adverse moral judgment on its demand for revenge, be it a demand in word or deed, attempted or not; provided that the demand be not excessive in view of the harm the holder of the right has suffered.
This definition of the moral right to revenge puts the essence of the right in the form of an INJUNCTION: injunction against a certain kind of moral judgment by a spectator. The practical reach of the injunction is based purely on what force soever can be derived from a moral argument. The injunction, being purely moral, does not enjoy the backing of centrally-monopolized violence; it is not positive law. But its relationship to positive law is at least two-fold:
1. A holder of the moral right to revenge may, absent positive law, justifiably demand that no adverse moral judgment be passed upon it, should it decide indeed to seek revenge; yet with the introduction of positive law, to which the holder of the moral right to revenge is presumed to submit itself, the said moral right must be so qualified, on cause of the holder's submission to the said law, that it would be entitled to having no adverse moral judgment passed on itself, only if it have reasonably exhausted established legal means before revenging; in other words, to the original moral right is now added a moral demand on the holder of the right itself, that it rely upon the law to the extent possible;
2. A holder of the moral right to revenge may nevertheless have no legal right to revenge, nor that to demand the law to avenge it at all; and if in such a case it indeed seeks revenge by its own hands, it would still be entitled to having no adverse moral judgment passed on it, but not to having no legal sanction on it imposed; it might be punished by the law, and legally so, for having revenged, but shall remain in the eye of morality fully justified.
The first point signals that the moral right to revenge is not absolute: the presence of positive law qualifies it. The second point stresses that the judgment of the law and of morality can diverge drastically; and that the respective realms of the moral and of the legal right to revenge must be clearly distinguished.
A further relationship between the moral right to revenge, on the one hand, and the legal right to demand that justice be done through the court against the wrong-doer, on the other hand, concerns the ROLE of the said moral right in criticizing the law. As indicated in the second point above, the law may, in some cases, provide no means to redress a particular wrong; yet it may be strongly felt, within the community over which the law has jurisdiction, that the wrong must be redressed, and that the victim has a moral right to avenge himself should the law insistently refuse to address the problem. Critics of the law, not necessarily holders of the right to revenge themselves, can then invoke that right and demand that the law be reformed accordingly; chronic failure of which would create, prima facie, a strong moral case against the the law's punishing, if indeed, those who seek revenge against the wrong-doer in question.
The moral right to revenge does not of itself encourage revenge; it is not, therefore, inconsistent with a prevailing social preference for forgiveness, mercy, love, and other like virtues. It does not incite hatred, insomuch as any right, moral or legal, need not be deemed intrinsically antagonistic to any of the said virtues; but it does bar certain kinds of moral judgments from being justified morally, namely, condemnation, by a spectator, of the demand of the right-holder for revenge. The negative character of the right can scarcely be over-emphasized.
The injunction against adverse moral judgments on the avenger represents a public recognition of the limit of moral judgment itself, which again comes in two forms:
1. In revenge, a human being unjustifiably harmed by another human being (leaving out the group case for simplicity's sake) restores his dignity, demonstrating that his person and his honor will not be violated at will, nor at no price. To recognize his right to revenge, is therefore to recognize his dignity, his person, and his honor. Nota bene: the moral right to revenge does not compel him to avenge himself; it only compels the spectator, by force moral, not to disregard, or even cheapen, the victim's dignity, person, and honor, by self-righteously condemning his demand for revenge;
2. Once the positive law is introduced, the moral right to revenge is qualified, but not negated in toto. This in turn signifies the public recognition, that the public demand that the victim seek legal means to redress the wrong, stands only in so far as such means is, in view of the condition of the social and political organization prevailing, indeed adequately provided.
Public recognition of the dignity of the victim, and public recognition of the conditional nature of restrictions imposed by the legal state on revenge, delimit in tandem what kind of moral judgment a spectator is entitled to passing on the victim. The spectator might not be in favor of revenge in the particular case, he might even try to convince the victim to opt for a different course of action; yet insomuch as the victim's moral right to revenge stands, the spectator has no ground, in morality, to condemn the victim, should the victim decide to put forth his demand, and even seek to realize it by his own hands. The law might seek to frustrate his efforts, and even punish him; but in morality remains he justified.
Y.T.
Sept. 14, 2006
Cambridge, MA