死，照你咁講我一直都老屈了伏爾泰

However, I doubt 蔡子強, according to you, would "defend to the death" anybody's right to say anything in what manner soever.

也可以這樣理解，蔡子強是下了判斷，認為學生的表達手法是可以接受的，只是不想表明。在文章的尾段，透露了蔡子強對大學的言論自由尺度的想法：

//相反，正正是當學生的看法與我們南轅北轍，與我們不同的時候，校方仍能表現出的尊重和包容，才真正最能體現出我們對獨立思考和批判思維的真誠，才最彌足珍貴。//

當然，這裡有足夠的詮釋空間，讀者有自由將他的言論調到極端位置，從而得出 YT 的結論；但你不得不同意，沒有足夠理由，否定蔡子強是採用比較保守的說法。

如果考慮到文章的目的，似乎不著重在理性角度上探究學生的表達手法正確與否，而是希望從感性的角度，分享自己的經驗和感想，而另一方面軟化讀者態度的同時，反思對大學生自主的尊重和包容。若蔡子強表明對自由尺度的想法，可能惹來不必要的爭辯，模糊撰文的目的；從策略角度看，可以理解為何蔡子強留下比較大的詮釋空間。

當然，你仍然可以堅持你的解讀，畢竟文本不是作者的私有。我只是想顯示，這文本在如何詮釋上有很大的彈性，蔡若要辯也不是難事。

Our author, 維雅 駱, asked: "中大的當權者當年若「公道」，何不安排既是弱勢亦是異議的聲音公平發言的權利？那樣，可能學生不需上台去「搗亂」。"

I dare ask our author, Were the students barred, legally or morally, from organizing panel discussions, assemblies, vigils, peaceful demonstrations, or putting up banners, handing out flyers, in a word, from using any of such means to express their political views? In the incident in question, the students were glaringly DEPRIVING the Vice-Chancellor of his RIGHT to speak. For whatever reason, our author believed that the disruption was justified. But when we come to the hypothetical disruption of 蔡子強's class, our author spoke in a very different tone: "如真有學生祇因不喜蔡子強的言論而無理取鬧，不用拿伏泰爾名言出來，大家自有定論。"

Interesting enough, our author did not hesitate to characterize the disruption as "無理取鬧." Now suppose, Professor M. spoke in his class against the Student Press, and some radical students ran up to the podium and disrupted the class. Would our author again characterize that disruption as "無理取鬧"? or this time as "有理取鬧"?

Our author ought to remember that the freedom of speech is accorded not only to those whose views our author prefers, but also to those whose views our author detests. This is in fact the true message of Voltaire's line ("Je deteste ce que vous écrivez ..."). Our author said: "抽象的伏泰爾名言的出處並不重要。"--well, not paying attention to the context of Voltaire's line is precisely what makes the quote, or mis-quote, "抽象"--"重要的是這話的精神顯然是要保護弱者而要求強者為此而「誓死」的。" I am afraid that Voltaire did NOT mean this at all: or else, why should he be ready to give up his life in order that l'abbé Le Riche--not a "弱者," we duly note--might continue to write? "它談的不是抽象的公平，而是正義。" Justice, I believe, with Voltaire, includes giving the right to speak to both the strong and the weak, both to him who is radical and to him who is conservative.

If our author does not like the true Voltaire, but only his, or her, own fancy about le philosophe, let our author choose a different icon to adore. But if our author still wants to invoke the ghost of Voltaire, I urge him, or her, to respect the true message of the defender of, among others, l'abbé Le Riche.

right, if Choi is anti-authority, he should not quote Voltaire as Voltaire is an authority.

if one is anti-anti-authority, one should not object to Choi's quoting Voltaire, as by quoting Voltaire, Choi is after all not anti-authority .

if one is anti-anti-authority, one is usually also anti-anti-elitism.

1. 駱維雅 declared: "我談的，是保衛弱者的權利的正義性。這是我的立場，甚至乎是絕對性的立場，公然地有傾向的立場。" If a person is deemed to have a right, then in most cases it shall be just to defend his right, it being immaterial whether he is strong or weak, rich or poor. But if the person ought not to have that right, but still claims it, I cannot see why his being weak or poor should make it just to defend that alleged right. If therefore our author meant, by the phrase "保衛弱者的權利的正義性," nothing more than a partial restatement of "保衛 [...] 權利的正義性," I should have no dispute with her. But if she meant something more, then I cannot but suspect that, to her way of thinking, Plight is/makes Right.

2. Then 駱維雅 went on to say, "1993年的中大校慶，學校當局明知學生有異議，卻不安排他們上台發表意見，衹容學校當局和權貴精英發言，在這個意義上，是剝奪了學生這弱勢社群在重要場合公開意見的機會。倘若高餛一如蔡子強形容的那樣開明與寬容，又如若他在事前已知學生的想法，他是否應容許學生上台講意見？" This is patently non-sense. What right had "學生這弱勢社群" to speak at each and every event organized by the CUHK? Fancy that in some graduation ceremony I, out of hatred against a certain high school official, climbed up the stage and disrupted the whole thing, declaring that the CUHK had deprived me of my right to speak at the ceremony. Fancy, alternatively, that I did it not out of hatred, but simply out of a desire to promote universal suffrage, or to protest against the so-called Central Values. Fancy whatever you will. What right would I have in all these scenarios? Would my plight--my being a small potato at the CUHK--confer upon me any such right?

Fancy next that we were at some press conference organized by the Student Press. Besides the editors there were also faculty members from Gender Studies. Suppose that I were a small potato again, who happened not to have been invited. The Gender Studies faculty members were all in support of the Press; but I happened to be against it. I cried: "It is wrong for the Student Press, which ought to represent the values of the whole community of CUHK students, now to represent only those of a small group of radicals who have simply usurped the paper. I demand that on this important occasion, a press conference it being, that I be accorded the same right to speak as the Gender Studies faculty members have! And if my right be not honored, I shall disrupt the conference by all means!" In fact, we really did not find any dissenters on the panels collected by the Press. Why? Would I then have the right to disrupt?

"校慶是一個公眾活動，不是私人宴會。它是一個表現大學風格、主張、思想、意識形態的舞台。學校當局與獲邀出席的精英權貴衹是大學中的一個小部份，他們是小數，但卻是強者。為什麽作為多數但卻是權力上弱勢的學生沒有正式發言的機會？" The university is not a state. The power of the school authorities does NOT come from the students, even if our author prefers to adopt a social-contractarian view of political power. Upon entry into the CUHK, the student does not give up any sovereign power he previously had, in order to constitute the power of the school authorities. Quite the contrary: the student, upon entry, accepts, formally or tacitly, the constitution of the CUHK, and all accompanying rules and by-laws, IN RETURN for all rights (including perhaps the right to obtain a degree upon satisfaction of certain requirements) conferred by those instruments. Those instruments do not confer upon the students, I would you agree, a say on each and every decision the school authorities are to make, and at each and every event the school authorities are to organize.

It might be objected, that this is too legal a view of the student's right and power. How about the moral view then? Consider a semi-official celebration organized by the Student Union. The Union is meant to represent all students in the CUHK community. Suppose I were one such student, who had long been very unhappy about the sort of activities organized by the Student Union. I were not invited by the organizers to speak on that occasion, but knew that it would be the most effective time and place for me to voice my resentment: I decided to disrupt it. I suspect that even on moral grounds many would declare my act unreasonable, if not in fact condemnable.

There is furthermore this statement by 駱維雅: "儘管如此，我並沒有認為學生最終决定以搗亂方式上台一定是最好辧法。這做法多份引起誤解與抹黑。恕我作為遙遠的第三者，决不能提出什麽所謂更好的辦法。但我不非難學生。我反而要說，做成那種尖銳對抗局面的，校方要付主責。" Let our author say expressly, whether or not her condemnation of the school authorities depends on the sort of political views the disrupters meant to voice. Fancy that on another occasion, let's say another celebration for the CUHK, the Vice-Chancellor were about to give a speech in praise of universal suffrage of the CE. I again were very unhappy with this political statement and decided to climb up the stage and disrupt him, I being deprived of my right, according to our author, to speak. How will our author rule on such a case? Will she lend me at least some moral support for my disruption?

3. Now comes another scenario: "蔡子強衹是一名學者，一般而言，他沒有多少權力去限制他人發言的權利，他很難（不是絕無機會）作為一個絕對性的強者去令其他人變成弱者.[...] 倘若蔡子強有利用他的教師或其他職權，例如無理在課堂上禁止學生的黠難，那就是另一回事了。到時若有學生作出強烈抗議舉動，我就會基本上認為主要責任該在蔡子強身上，而要保衛處於弱勢者位置上的學生了。" Suppose 蔡子強 decided that the class would have two components: lecture and tutorial. He decided further that in the lecture he would speak most of the time, so that he might go through all the materials--his version of things--he wanted the students to know; and that in the tutorial students would be encouraged to discuss among themselves in small groups. I again believed that speaking in small groups would deprive me of my right to have my views heard by the class entire; decided to disrupt the lecture, believing that it is biased, ideological, and even morally suspicious. 蔡子強 forbade me to speak; I continued to hold up banners, to shout, and even to try to climb up the podium. 蔡子強 suggested that I make my views heard in the tutorials; I found that oppressive. How will our author rule on such a case then? 蔡子強 would have effectively deprived me of my right to speak to the class, I this small potato.

4. Lastly, our author declared: "我絲毫不想"fancy about le philosophe"，也絕不會"choose a different icon to adore"。在目前的風波和爭議裡面，伏泰爾與le philosophe 對我而言一點也不重要，伏泰爾有說過甚麽沒說過甚麽也不重要，有人對據說出自他的名句作此一解釋或那一演譯也不重要，一如我不以為要爭議Voltaire 該是伏泰爾還是伏爾泰。我覺得不妨把這些問題留待歷史學者或哲學家去做。" Why is our author so reluctant to confront the fact that Voltaire, this icon of many people, might have taught a moral lesson a little different from the one she tries ardently to preach? Is it because, to her way of thinking, Plight really makes, or even is, Right--a principle not, unfortunately, endorsed by Voltaire?

"我更情願在目前這具體的事件和93年中大校慶風波中站到弱者一方，說出不要告訴我當強者壓弱者的時候，反要或公然地、或隱晦地高談平等對待強者與弱者的發言權。公平是為了正義，在世界上未有公義、在弱者未得公義之前，空談公平發言權是不吃人間煙火，客觀上衹會助紂為虐。" This whole thought, grand as it sounds, reduces itself to this one simple statement: 弱者 is never wrong. Now, why is 弱者 never wrong? our author never told us. But if 弱者 can be on the wrong, let our author make it clear, that when it is so, she will justly CONDEMN 弱者, and not pretend that Plight makes/is Right. Our author might fancy that she would elect to be on the side of the weak no matter what; and then, holding up her principle of "Plight makes/is Right", declare essentially that she is ever on the right. How nice this is! For then no one would ever be able to challenge our author on moral grounds--"I am on the side of the weak. And you?"--and such notions as right and wrong would collapse completely into the notions of weak and strong. But in order to enjoy this moral benefit, our author must always choose the really weak party to side with; as soon as she finds herself on the side of the not so weak, she would immediately be, according to her principle, on the wrong. This, I submit, is no easy political position to hold.

Brevity is sometimes to be recommended: so long as it comes not as a way to evade an opponent's central challenges. Our author has written a brief reply, on which we are inclined to make two observations.

(1) Thus spake our author: "我談的是相當具體的事例中我採取的具體取態和立論。[...] 都是以推想一種具體情境為出發的。Y.T.卻喜歡把它們抬高至一般的、抽象又抽離、甚至是放諸四海而皆合用的平面，既是 principle, 又是thought，或是simple statement, 我卻寧願說一如他最後所採用的字眼，是一種 political position。" Perhaps our author had overlooked the four or five very concrete hypotheticals I offered, meant to gauge her very concrete thoughts--or political positions, if she will--on various matters. How, after these many concrete things, she happened still to believe that I only speak in abstracto ("抬高至一般的、抽象又抽離、甚至是放諸四海而皆合用的平面"), I cannot quite tell. For my very concrete argument on why the students had no right to disrupt the celebration, she would do well to re-read pt.2 of my reply. If she decided that ruling on my hypotheticals would not be to her liking, she could say so, but at least not condemn me for a crime I scarcely wanted to commit.

(2) Now, towards the end of her reply, she claimed that I unjustifiably overlooked her proviso: "明明白白具體指「.... 當強者壓弱者的時候 ...」." I wish to say that myopia has not deprived me of so much sight; yet I do confess that I had a great difficulty in understanding in what way that quoted bit could be a proviso. In pt.4 of my reply, I asked our author whether she would condemn the weak, if they happened to be, in her judgment, on the wrong. I took it that she would. But the proviso would be meaningful, only if our author would really, on a non-trivial set of occasions, find the weak on the wrong.

I think our author does believe that the weak have all the right to be as radical as they want to (Cf. "讓Y.T. 繼續去為強者請命，責弱者無權過激好了"). To demand that the weak not be, in my view, that radical, would constitute, given our author's "political position," already "強者壓弱者的時候"; the weak would, for our author, automatically be on the right then. So, to render her proviso meaningful, our author must say expressly when the weak might justly be seen as on the wrong, and so to be condemned, or at least not to be defended. Our author avoided this key question. I of course could not ask her to discourse in abstracto; but she might still make use of my hypotheticals, and announce her ruling thereon. In this way, things will be very concrete, and the meaningfulness of her proviso well ascertained. Thank you.