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從進度追補指數看高鐵的官僚延誤

從進度追補指數看高鐵的官僚延誤
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高鐵香港段於2 0 11年6月及7月錄得項目進度的黃色燈號後, 又於2 0 11年8月至2 0 1 4年5月期間連續錄得項目進度共3 4 次紅色燈號。但運房局在2014年5月才驀然驚醒,高呼被港鐵欺騙。

檢討事件的獨立專家留意到,高鐵香港段亮起紅色燈號已有一段長時間。獨立專家建議,規定項目不能連續發出超過某個數目的紅色燈號。若連續發出多次紅色燈號,項目檢討程序則應啟動。(注3)

獨立專家以兩個指數,指出2013年年尾,高鐵工程項目已陷入無法追補的階段。

進度績效指數

進度績效指數是工程的實際進度與計劃進度之比。當它跌低於0.95便應該注意。表中黑線代表整體進度,它包括較上虛線的電機工程和之下的土木工程。

指數表示整體工程從2011年11月開始惡化,至2013年11月的最低點 0.65。它表示其時的土木工程的指數只有0.6,這時機電的指數急遽惡化。這是因為,土本工程無法提供足夠樓面面積,讓機電工程施工。

專家表示,若路政署在當初能檢視這一指數,也應該看到,大量『追回措施』( Delay Recovery Measures programme )的成效有限。 (注1)

進度追補指數

進度追補指數是(計劃進度 - 實質進度 ) / ( 1 - 實質進度 )。它表達餘下工程要趕上通車日期所需作出的改善程度。

專家表示,當這一指數跌低於3成,已表示工程差不多無法如期完成。因為這表示,以十小時工作日計,每天要加班3小時。整體項目在2013年4月已到達這臨界點。到2013年年尾,它惡化至6成,即是政府應該知道工程已不能靠『追回措施』解救。

結語

專家的建議無情地指出官僚誤事。這一重大事件說明了回歸時的一個命題,英國人做到的,到了中國人或香港人手裡,便不成事。明明是工程界慣用的指標,為什麼要由外國專家在事後指出呢?港鐵和路政署不乏技術專家,這是當前的討好文化壞事。

更有甚者,獨立專家的建議已為港鐵董事局和政府所接受。它們在向立法會之後的滙報和現在到財委會要求追加撥款,仍然不以此標準披露資料。也就是說,立法會議員根本不知道高鐵的實際進度和資本開支要求。

注一

Schedule Performance Index

7.10 The Independent Experts found that the interpretation of delays can be informed by the automated reporting system. The actual programme progress and the planned programme progress can be used to calculate a Schedule Performance Index (SPI), for the programme at a certain stage, as:
SPI = Actual Progress / Planned Progress.

7.11 Figure 7 shows the SPI from November 2011 to July 2014 against the 2015 opening date. The graph shows that Project has gradually deteriorated from November 2011 until September 2013 when the performance index reached the lowest point of 0.65. The curve shows that at the lowest point the SPI for the civil work reached 0.6. The graph also shows that E&M finished most of the design work in July 2013 and subsequently ran out of work sites to achieve progress.

Schedule Performance Index (SPI) of the XRL

7.12 In the view of the Independent Experts, if this information had been included in past reporting meetings it would have been clear to decision makers that: (1) despite the large number of DRMs being implemented, their effect on Project progress was minimal; and (2) the productivity of civil contracts started to improve slightly after October 2013 but at the same time the E&M contracts significantly deteriorated due to lack of work spaces.

注二

Schedule Recovery Index

7.13 An alternative way of reporting the recoverability of delays is to estimate the productivity increase that needs to be achieved and sustained for the remainder of the project in order to meet the opening date. This Schedule Recovery Index (SRI) is calculated as:

SRI = (Planned Progress - Actual Progress) / (1 – Actual Progress)
7.14 Figure 8 depicts the required productivity increase for the Project between November 2011 and July 2014 to achieve the 2015 opening.

7.15 In the view of the Independent Experts, a productivity improvement of more than 30% is highly unlikely. Achieving and sustaining a 30% improvement is equivalent to working 3 hours overtime per 10 hour work day. The historic data in Figure 8 shows that after April 2013 the Project needed to achieve a more than 30% productivity increase to meet the 2015 opening date. By the end of 2013 the required increase in productivity was higher than 60%. It is the view of the Independent Experts that achieving such an increase would have been almost impossible.

7.16 Consequently, if decision makers had been presented with information like that above, they would, in the view of the Independent Experts, have concluded no later than the second half of 2013 that the Project was irrecoverable.

注三

Enhancement to the programme KPI

7.17 As discussed above, the Independent Experts found that the Project reported red lights for a prolonged period in time. This indicates that either the KPI definition was flawed or appropriate action was not taken.

7.18 According to the KPI definition, a red light indicates a delay of more than eight weeks. The buffer in the original baseline was twelve weeks. The Independent Experts recommend tailoring the definition of traffic lights to the specific cost and schedule contingencies in the current baseline of projects rather than using a consistent definition across all projects.

7.19 The Independent Experts further recommend that clear rules are defined that a project cannot report more than a given number of consecutive red lights (depending on the overall length of the project) before triggering a review of the project. The outcome of the review should be a re-baselining of the project and an actionable turn-around plan, in the view of the Independent Experts.

7.20 Consecutive red lights must be linked to a clear plan of action with clear accountabilities and deadlines to bring project performance back on track. In other words, the PjT and the contractors must have responsibility to demonstrably recover performance by a set deadline.
Suggested DRMs need to clearly specify by when they are going to be met and how much they will improve performance, so that the PjT can select the appropriate steps for short and long term recovery. The decision as to whether DRMs are sufficient needs to be driven by data.

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