http://www.mingpaonews.com/20060228/faa1.htm
(戴耀廷 〈宗教仇恨褻瀆 言論自由與宗教自由〉 明報 2006-02-28 論壇 A28)
*The link may have lapsed; a copy of the Essay is found on a mainland Chinese forum, which I reproduced as an appendix below.
Professor Benny Tai tried to clarify certain concepts for the public; but we can only marvel at the many interesting moves he made to suggest a conclusion, without articulating it in broad daylight. This I think is legal mumbo-jumbo at its best.
For ease of reference, we shall put up, at the beginning of our investigation, the full English version of the ICCPR Article 20:
Article 20
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.
(See: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm)
The structure of Prof. Tai's clarification consists of a nice antinomy between laws against religious hatred (the ICCPR) and laws against blasphemy (e.g. the common law in the UK). Since the former is contained in an international treaty, and allegedly embodies the universal standards of civil rights; whereas the latter is only national legislation, burdened by the historical experience of individual countries (though major European countries converge at having such laws), a legal hierarchy (international-national) is quietly established in the reader's mind. This is all fine, until the legal-positive hierarchy, without further qualifications in the argument, be turned into a moral-normative one.
The structure by itself does not point to clear enough conclusions. The Form needs some Content to work its Magic. So, the Professor reminded us that under the ICCPR standard, only the act of the accused (A, in his terminology) need be considered (to the exclusion of the potential emotional harm on the victim (C)); whereas under the common law, for instance, victim's emotional harm is a crucial part of the standard. In legal parlance, we may provisionally call the ICCPR standard an objective one (independent of victim), and the common law standard a subjective one (dependent on victim).
We are further told, a fact which the Professor dared not conceal, that the common law against blasphemy protects only Christianity; and that neither the ICCPR, nor any other international treaty or agreement obliges any country to legislate against blasphemy in general. Now the Professor's clarification is ripe for tabulation:
ICCPR Common Law
International law National law
Objective standard Subjective standard
Nothing against blasphemy Against blasphemy
No discrimination among faiths Protection only for Christianity
If a muslim tries to invoke the ICCPR against the cartoonists, he is crippled by the fact that there is no explicit provision against blasphemy; that, if he resorts to the "religious hatred clause" he is not allowed to apply a subjective standard. If he turns then to national law, well, he finds that every legal armory is ready, save that it can only be deployed for the defence of Christ's Faith. So our little muslim is trapped and doomed.
The Professor could have stated this obvious violation of equality in so many words; but he did not. Instead, he tried to acquit the West by several moves. First, the fact that there is no national law condemning blasphemy against Islam was presented as not obliged by the ICCPR (rather than as morally obligeable by similar provisions respecting Christianity and considerations of "equality before the law"). Second, the fact that the ICCPR applies an objective standard was presented almost as a matter of fact - "the" standard perhaps - rather than in the light of a much looser standard in national anti-blasphemy laws.
The conclusion the Professor seemed to be suggesting is, that under international law (deemed a reasonable balance between dignity of religion and freedom of speech), the muslims have no case; and that their having no case either under national law is not a violation of international standards. Outright discrimination becomes "sorry, the positive law is so and so, and morally we are not obliged any further."
But we can certainly turn the whole thing around. We realize, that international law (in the eye of the West) need not provide against blasphemy because major European countries already have such laws nationally, and that these countries' failure to extend such national protection to the Islamic faith is a clear violation of the legal principle of equality, and the moral principle of respect.
Instead of painting a West humbly relying on the clear clauses of positive law and eagerly suggesting the muslims to learn the universal standard, as the Professor would love to, we point to a West cunningly hiding behind the protective umbrella of discriminatory national laws while bidding the muslim to bang on a residual international consolation prize--which, miserably, he is still denied.
Law is a funny business. But we can even go beyond the legal mumbo-jumbo, and ask the Professor: Why is Western secularism the standard for moral jugments in this case? The Professor himself admitted that to the West, religion was mostly an individual matter; but to the muslims, it could well be a collective concern. Applying the principle of respect, it is hard to see why we must assume that the individualistic attitude be the moral norm, against which the muslims' reactions would be judged.
The Professor's clarification clarified not the subtle issues involved from a technical and neutral point of view, but only his presumed Western approach. The clarificatory structure is established to prepare the reader to see the issues in this particular way; the form makes it much harder to detect the intrusion of value judgments. Which is, as I said, legal mumbo jumbo at its best.
Y.T.
Febraury 27, 2006.
Appendix: Prof.Tai's Essay
【明报专讯】作者为香港大学法律学院副教授 (2006-02-28 05:05:00)
西方报章刊登穆罕默德的漫画在全球引发回教徒强烈的反应，当中的争议涉及多个人权和法律的概念。这包括 了“宗教仇恨”、“亵渎”、“言论自由”和“宗教自由”。这些概念既复杂又相互关连，公众在讨论时可能容易混淆，致产生不必要的分歧。本文尝试厘清这些概念，把争议的重点聚焦，希望让大家更易就此议题取得最大的共识，减少纷争。
禁止“宗教仇恨煽动歧视与暴力”
《公民及政治权利国际公约》第 20（ 2）条规定：“任何鼓吹民族、种族或宗教仇恨的主张，构成煽动歧视、敌视或强暴者，应以法律加以禁止。”国际人权要求各国立法禁止人们以宗教仇恨为由，煽动别人去歧视、敌视或向其他人施以暴力的行为。宗教仇恨涉及 3方：第一方（甲方）是作出煽动行为或言论的人；第二方（乙方）是被煽动作出歧视、敌视或暴力的行为的人；第三方（丙方）是被人歧视、敌视或施以暴力的人。
构成宗教仇恨未必需要有人被煽动，也不需要有人实质被歧视、敌视或施以暴力，只要有人作出的行为，客观地看有很大可能令人因此而被煽动以宗教仇恨为由去歧视、敌视或向其他人施以暴力，那已构成了罪行。
禁止宗教仇恨的法律要保护的权利是丙方不受乙方的歧视、敌视或暴力的侵害，但针对禁制的是甲方向乙方煽动宗教仇恨的行为或言论。丙方不需要知道也不一定要对甲方的行为有主观的负面感受。
西方国家仅立法保护基督宗教
同样，即使丙方对甲方的行为或言论有主观的负面感受，但若甲方的行为或言论并未构成以宗教仇恨为由去煽动乙方去歧视、敌视或向丙方施以暴力，那并非宗教仇恨法所禁制的。因此判断这些漫画是否有煽动宗教仇恨而须禁止，取决的并非回教徒的主观感受，而是刊出这些漫画是否会煽动其他人去歧视、敌视或向回教徒施以暴力。制定禁止宗教仇恨的法律是各国的责任。
禁止亵渎的法律与禁止宗教仇恨的法律的焦点不同。很多西方国家都有禁止亵渎的法律。英国普通法就有以下的规定：“任何出版若对神、耶稣基督或圣经；或英国教会依法确立的祷文，有轻蔑、辱骂、粗野无礼、荒唐的物事，即属亵渎。发表或出版对基督宗教不友善，或不承认神存在的言论，若言语文雅或温和，则不算亵渎。涉及的准则有关教理的表达方式，而非其内容。” 这些西方国家禁止亵渎的法律主要是保护基督宗教，对回教及其他宗教不提供相同的保护。
禁止亵渎的法律与禁止宗教仇恨的法律有两个分别。第一、禁止亵渎保护的内容除了是某一宗教的尊严外，也包括了信徒（即丙方）的主观宗教情感。第二、它要禁制的是甲方向丙方作出亵渎行为或言论，并不如禁止宗教仇恨的法律般需要有一个乙方才能构成罪行。
国际人权却没有如禁止宗教仇恨的法律般，明文要求各国必须制定禁止亵渎的法律，也没有要求在制定时必须给予所有宗教一样的保护。因此，即使这些西方国家只保护基督宗教，或是没有相类似的法律保护其他宗教和它们的信徒，那是没有明显地违反了国际人权的规定。
根据国际人权的标准，各国是否有责任保护所有宗教的信徒免他们宗教的情感受到伤害呢？这就关乎禁止亵渎的法律与言论自由及宗教自由的关系。
《公民及政治权利国际公约》第 19条确认所有人在行使言论自由时都带有特殊的义务和责任，因此得受某些限制。若为了尊重“他人的权利”，言论自由是可以受到限制的。“他人的权利”包括了其他人的宗教自由。
《公民及政治权利国际公约》第 18条保障人们表示（ manifest）自己的宗教或信仰的自由。欧洲人权法庭曾在Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria一案作出这样的理解：人在行使其表示自己的宗教的自由时，他必须容忍和接受其他人会拒绝他的宗教，或宣扬与他的宗教敌对的其他宗教信念。但政府可能在一些情下有责任确保任何拒绝或反对某一宗教信念的表达方式，不会影响所有人和平地享有宗教自由。在一些极端的情下，一些反对或拒绝的方法可能会产生实质的后果，使那些持有被反对或拒绝的宗教信念的人难以继续持有或表达他们的宗教信念。不过也有少数的法官认为宗教自由并不包括保护一个人的宗教情感不受到伤害。
即使我们确认宗教自由包括宗教情感不受伤害，这还未足以支持各国有责任制定适用于所有宗教的亵渎法，保护人们的宗教情感。这可能只可用以支持一些国家的选择性的亵渎法合乎言论自由而已。我们要思想的是，在多元社会保障各人的宗教情感的理据所在。
由于西方社会经历几百年的世俗化或非宗教化，只视宗教为个人行为，有如个人嗜好般不涉太大的社群；故宗教情感并未如回教世界般那么受到重视。
亵渎法应针对表达方式
即使制定适用于所有宗教的亵渎法，所要禁制的言论和行为，要针对的应是表达方法而非表达的内容。而且被禁制的表达方法必须是令人极度难以容忍的。是否亵渎，不能单单以信徒的主观情感来决定，而须在一个多元社会中大众认同的标准下也被视为极度不当，才可予以禁制。
回看西方报章刊登的漫画，我们要问的是它们在多元和客观的准则下是否已达到那极度不当的程度。
西方报章刊登穆罕默德的漫画引发了我们思考禁止宗教仇恨的法律和禁止亵渎的法律。两者要处理的问题并不相同，虽然会有重叠但所禁制的行为却不同，禁制的理据也不同。这正可让我们在多元的社会下，重新反思人和信仰及人与人的关系。