John Rawls 是不是為民主下其中一個定義的人？
Anyway, 寫得好簡明，對哲學初學者很方便。

主要的project是訂立一種公正的分配理論，民主並不是他工作的範圍。

瘋兄﹕
中文譯名沒有統一譯法﹐所以要用英文學名加以區別。

龍五兄﹕
我文中說的兩大教條﹐不就是你說你OP嗎﹖
而討論的重點﹐是我們為什麼要接納那兩條OP。

我當然沒有看原著﹐只是讀二年級的政治哲學入門課﹐不過你說的OP課本倒有quote﹐我還以為我的兩大教條譯得不錯。如果漏了什麼﹐請勞煩指正。

你的所有哲學文章只是說一兩句相關的介紹
根本其餘的全都是你自己的意見
請不要將自己的意見放入前人口中

尊重他人. 尊重自己.
please read b4 write

下面是小子粗略的見解:
===================
在羅斯的成名作《正義論》之中，他始終地強調公平即正義這一個概念。如其他的自由主義者一樣，正義在於人的平等權利能被公平地實踐。個人的天賦人權不以公共利益為由而被剝奪。在《正義論》的起始部分，羅斯已表明正義為社會組織第一美德。這並不是一廂情願的猜想又或是他個人要求的倫理法則。相反的，它具有實際的功效。因為，任何一個社會組織就算是多麼有效率和嚴謹，若果缺乏正義，那麼，他一定會被人拋棄。另一方面，羅斯認為政治哲學主要的任務在於使公民之間相互尊重的社會合作得以維持。其中包括如何理解政治、經濟和社會理論之間的差別；自由要求和平等要求之間的競爭，等等．．．

在保障個人權利和維持社會和諧穩定的衝突之間，羅斯選擇了以社會契約論去作為協調社會系統的基礎。他認為，公民間的自由和權利需要互相的了解和尊重，然而，自由和權利的基礎必須要合乎正義，社會和諧才能得以持久。

羅斯認為，要建立一種對所有人來說都是公平的正義原則，需要從正義的“原初狀態”(Original Position)出發。所謂的原初狀態是一種假設的和非歷史性的處境構想，當中對正義的了解具有普遍性的意義，亦即所有行為是合理的。而另外，他認為社會上的某些資產是構成每一個理性的人的理想生活是必須的，這些資產就是社會基本資產（social primary goods）。在原初狀態之中，這些社會基本資產的分配亦會是公平的。這樣就可以建立人們達成社會合作契約的基礎，從而可以建構公民之間的社會合作條款。

然而要達到原初狀態，參與者需要退到“無知之幕”（Veil of Ignorance）之後去決定原初狀態的內容。所謂的無知之幕就是假設當事人以一種與自身既有利益無關、亦即一種普遍的角度去衡量原初狀態的內容。因為只有在當事人撇除掉自身的既定利益，公眾才能有效地去就正義這一概念進行討論以至達成公平的共識。

可以理解的是，在建立原初狀態的過程中，參與者的個人自由權利會被盡量擴展到一個不與他人的自由權利相左的相容點。另外，羅斯對於公平這一概念是從社會基本資產分配和社會機會上說的。他認為，透過社會基本資產會因為透過原初狀態而再被分配，社會參與者的理想化生活的可能性亦因而得到保障，從而達到分配正義的效果。而社會基本資產以外的財產，其獲得的機會條件對所有人都是公平的。但同時因為人有自由的意願和能力，在機會公平的情況下，社會和經濟上的不平等是可以被容許存在的。

羅斯理論的起點在於一套以建立以公平為本公共正義的程序，而所謂的公平是從原初狀態上出發、在機會均等和幫助社會上最不利的人的概念上而被理解的。故此，某程度上的財產再分配是必然的結果。

You made your conclusion too fast.

First, I m not supporting contractualism. Rawl hv spent 10 years in Harvard for "Theory of Justice". However, I think that is too much and Rawls' theory of justice is over-valued. coz i dun think this is universal. And actually, I do against his theory in some areas.

Second, you said I hv missed Rawl's point, but actually i didnt intent to write everything abt Rawls

BTW, Rawls hvnt mentioned tht 要給窮人比最基本的需要多的資源。 Instead, Rawls does support that (as you mentioned) "窮人分配最基本生活需要的資源就夠了" But what is the meaning of 最基本生活需要?? Rawls didnt meantioned abt it, instead, he uses the "OP" to define it.

PS (to everyone): my knowledge in philosophy is barely on the 幼稚園 level, pls comment if i hv write anything wrong.

Hevangel手頭那一本的Contemporary Political Philosophy:An introduction我也有, 不過Kymlicka並沒有這樣理解Rawls吧。

順手一提, Rawls的OP固然是推出他兩條principles的前提, 不過最受爭議的是他OP設計本身所包含對人平等的看法, Kymlicka是這樣寫的。

"Rather, the hypothetical contract is a way of embodying a certain conception of equality, and a way of extracting the conseqeunce of that conception for the just regulation of social institution. By removing sources of bias and requiring unanimity, Rawls hopes to find a solution that is acceptable to everyone from a position of equality─i.e. that respects each person's claim to be treated as a free and equal being."(Kymlicka, p.64)

這才是Kymlicka對Rawls看法的重心, 他甚至認為當代政治哲學,不論是liberalism(左派自由主義), libertarianism(右派/放任自由主義), 甚至是Marx的communism, 都包含了一abstract idea of equality(Kymlicka p.4), 如果hevangel是做筆記的話, 也就做得太爛了吧。

可能他看錯了Kymlicka寫的"John Rawls was one of the first to present such an alternative"的意思吧, 才會說出Rawls提出新自由主義的豪言壯語。至於概念錯誤, 實在不用我多費唇舌呢。我也是在讀political philosophy的, 才讀了一年左右, 不過起碼知道liberalism同libertarianism都(聲稱)繼承了古典自由主義(即John Locke等)人的傳統, 起碼不會以為neo-liberalism, 即戴卓爾夫人的那一套, 會是Rawls的信徒吧。

Kymlicka的書可沒有這麼爛, 如果hevangel想淺說的話, 就請多一點認真的讀書吧, 不要辱沒了Kymlicka。越認真讀, 越會發現自己知識的不足, 如果hevangel真的想鑽研哲學, 恐怕還要下很多很多的功夫。

除了把liberalism錯譯為「新自由主義」（那裏有個「新」字）

還有以下誤譯︰

功用主義—效益主義（utilitarianism）？
道德本能主義—道德直覺主義（moral intuitionism）

（１）

「一個公義的社會就是公平的社會﹐每個人的基本人權﹐利益受到保障。」

一個公義的社會不等於是公平的社會，rawls的difference principle正好指出了那些不公平是合符公義的。

（２）

「資源的分配比需遵守最大化最不幸社群利期的準則。換一句話說﹐公平的定義是資源均分﹐除非不均分配可以讓最差一群人也最受惠。」

Rawls的公平可指機會的平等，哪裏有資源均分的意思？

（３）

「古典自由主義保障基本人權﹐讓人可以在公平的情況下自由競爭。可是由為人生出來就是不平等﹐有些人家境富裕﹐有些人天資聰資﹐在公平競爭下的起步點全靠運氣安排﹐因此社會就要通過資源分配﹐讓所有人在同一的起步點開始競爭﹐所以就支持不同定律了。」

difference principle是指出社會可以容許不平等，如果那種不平等對所有人（包括生活狀況最差的人）都有利。這與以上的理解明顯不符。

（４）

「其次就是不同定律沒有指明資源要代代清﹐若一個父母通過自身的努力﹐他們有權決定如何去使用賺取或分配到的資源。他們可以望子成龍的心態﹐希望子女未來有更好的生活﹐犧牲自己的可以享受的資源去裁培兒女。換一句話說強行要把人有起步點拉平﹐就會損害了父母公平使用資源的權利。」

如果你明白了difference principle的意思，就不會明白上文說什麼。

（５）

「要把所有人的起步點拉平聽好像很公平﹐可是卻不切實際的空想。」

Rawls何時說要把所有人最後就是養懶人的問題﹐基層所的起步點拉平呢？

（６）

「以窮有時候不全因為天生不幸﹐不同定律不能解決這個問題﹐因為沒有辨去細分基層的成因﹐這亦是福利主義常被批評的地方。做又三十六﹐唔做又三十六﹐與我們心目中公平的定義不乎。」

同（４）

（７）

我想，以上幾點其他留言者都明白了，但大家卻沒有明確指出作者徹底誤解difference principle，故留此言。

// 另外 Ivy 和林冰都說了, original position 和 veil of ignorance 是 Theory of Justice 的理論基礎, 它們是假設而非結論。兩條法則都是根據 OP 的假設而推論出來的。//

我的理解有點不同。
Rawls用Veil of ignorance同埋intiution argument去推理出為什麼Original position是正確。那兩條法則只是把OP重新覆述一篇。

在Liberalism中OP是結論而不是假設。批評Liberalism就要指出OP不是veil of ignorance同intuition argument必然的結論。

問的問題不是OP是什麼﹐而是問我們為什麼要接受OP﹐為什麼OP是好是公義。

// Rawls hvnt mentioned tht 要給窮人比最基本的需要多的資源。 Instead, Rawls does support that (as you mentioned) "窮人分配最基本生活需要的資源就夠了" But what is the meaning of 最基本生活需要?? Rawls didnt meantioned abt it, instead, he uses the "OP" to define it. //

請參看OP中的2a﹐要最大化最不幸那些人的利益。
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle,
所以Rawls是認為公平的分配是要比最基本的生活需要多。
舉例﹐一個人最基本的生活要需是$5000﹐現在有兩個分配放法。
A﹕有錢人$50000﹐中產$10000﹐窮人$5000
B﹕有錢人$10000﹐中產$8000﹐窮人$6000
跟據Rawls的OP﹐要選擇B才叫公平。

(!@*^(@*#^&，你識唔識睇英文，人地話「But what is the meaning of 最基本生活需要?? Rawls didnt meantioned abt it, instead, he uses the "OP" to define it. 」，你居然重申因為maximin所以「Rawls是認為公平的分配是要比最基本的生活需要多」？仲有其他不知所謂，真係你話begging the question就係乎？

仲有乜乜七七你「的理解有點不同」？你當全世界唔識雞腸唔識去SEP睇？

The original position is a hypothetical situation in which rational calculators, acting as agents or trustees for the interests of concrete individuals, are pictured as choosing those principles of social relations under which their principals would do best. Their choices are subject to certain constraints, however, and it is these constraints which embody the specifically moral elements of original position argumentation. Crudely, the rational calculators do not know facts about their principals which would be morally irrelevant to the choice of principles of justice. This restriction on their reasoning is embodied, picturesquely, in Rawls's so-called veil of ignorance, which occludes information, for instance, about principals’ age, sex, religious beliefs, etc. Once this information about principals is unavailable to their agents, the plurality of interested parties disappears, and the problem of choice is rendered determinate. (Because each individual's trustee has the same information and motivation as every other individual's trustee, the original position is a situation of choice, not of "negotiation" between a plurality of distinct individuals.) According to Rawls, agents so situated would choose two principles of justice, lexically ordered, affirming the equality of basic rights and an approach to social inequalities governed by the difference principle, according to which inequalities are unjust unless removing them would worsen the situations of the worst-off members of society. Original position argumentation is an example of contemporary contractualism, involves a pure-proceduralist approach to the determination of moral principles, and is framed by reflective equilibration with widely agreed principles of public morality. It also illustrates the pragmatism of Rawls's approach to political theorizing.

(corrected a typo)

Hey! difference principle imply 窮人在“公平”分配中比最基本的生活需要為多??? how come you hv such an idea? from which part of text ? could you pls advise ?

保你大，段引文就係回應你話

「我的理解有點不同。
Rawls用Veil of ignorance同埋intiution argument去推理出為什麼Original position是正確。那兩條法則只是把OP重新覆述一篇。

在Liberalism中OP是結論而不是假設。批評Liberalism就要指出OP不是veil of ignorance同intuition argument必然的結論。」

OP係一個假設處境，假設你受Veil of ignorance所限，咁當人處於OP之中，會選擇咩principles of justice呢？intuitively，就係difference principle囉（因為Rawls話理性既大家都maximin）。睇清楚，OP係一個hypothesis，但呢個hypothesis冇包括assume difference principle係正確既。

你連OP係乜都未知（唔係因為veil of ignorance乜乜物物所以結論OP正確，veil of ignorance+intuition同OP係冇呢種關係既），仲話counter-argument？你唯一講得對既係，人地係用OP來支持difference principles，但點支持？人地係有argument既（佢sound唔sound係別一回事），唔係好似你咁將個claim用唔同文字寫幾次就當one supports the other。

多Q餘，我點解要defend difference principle？我講過我中意咩主義？我都覺得Rawls既理論有問題（好粗略，畢竟無深入學過），問題係你既所謂反駁根本唔係反駁。你話difference principle係錯--因為唔公平，點解？你係OP當中係唔會選difference principle（你覺得佢唔公平）？但你唔會maximin咩？又或者你唔中意OP點被interpret？咁咪reflective equilibrium囉。你唔搞清楚人地個argument structure，駁乜？明未？

你唔信就自己去問prof囉！（不過for your own reference only，因為我都唔知點可能信你轉述。）

1. 「一個人最基本的生活要需是$5000」
這項「最基本的生活需要」是從哪裹爆出來的？甚麼是最「基本」「需要」？夠錢買醬油白飯頂肚露宿街頭「吊住條命」？還是要夠你基本娛樂社交生活書簿費？可以就此憑空的談基本生活所需嗎？

2. Rawls話"they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society"
那麼他在哪兒說過greatest benefit即係金錢收入銀碼最高呀？

我想沒人一出生就學會哲學，而且很多人都與我一樣，在哲學科上是門外漢或只到初學者的程度。

我必須要說，討論中出現一種態度「你不懂就別胡扯」，「胡扯也要有個限度」，這個態度對初學者是非常窒息的，尤其是一些初學者根本無打算成為學者，學哲學只是學習少許處世之道而已，只會買幾本 History of Philosophy 的通介，每個現代哲學題目都大多都沒有看過原典。

我可以理解，一些人持「不懂就別胡扯」的出發點是保護初學者，學歪了要糾正就很困難，尤其是對沒看過原典的人。然而，對初學者來說最重要是切入點，禁止錯誤的訊息並不會製造切入點！至於「侮辱原作者」之說，我絕不同意，世間哪有人會因為誤解別人著作就等同侮辱別人？這是上綱上線的批評。

至於譯名的問題，作者一開始就把原文的英文貼上，大家看墨落也知道作者是指 liberalism 而不是 neo-liberalism。我記得上年世貿會議有遊行，有外人問質我一些中文字是指什麼，其中「自由」一詞其我十分困擾，依上文下理是指 neo-liberalism 但又混入 freedom 的意思，我只好說 neo-liberalism 的意思。這個例子才是概念上的問題！把此文的譯名說成概念上的問題，不是太過上綱上線嗎？你以為初學者真的會誤會嗎？

網絡上一些 CDROM 就是這樣迫出來的，不說不錯，繼續唔認識，繼續拒絕對話，超出了糾正錯誤的範圍。這樣的態度對初學者是很心寒的。

1. 最低生活標準﹐大慨是兩餐溫飽﹐有瓦庶頭不用日曬雨淋﹐小孩子有接受教育的機會﹐這應該和社會福利處的數據差不多﹐但肯定不包括買煙買馬的閒錢。

2. Rawls去archive greatest benefit的方法就是redistribution of social goods﹐即是分錢是也。

3. 理性的人不一定要用maxmin去擇選principle of justice﹐咁就不會得出difference principle的結論。你可以看多次我原文中對Contract Argument的批評。依家係你搞唔清楚我個counter argument的structure係乜呀。

回林冰﹐

我真係唔明你想問乜。有冇人可以解話。

初初仲驚咁解晒俾你聽即係教埋你寫paper，家陣發現擔心黎都多餘。你以為唔講bio就唔會斷正就可以掩耳盜鈴？

給麥當勞：你覺得佢似係學野？故意歪曲甚至作reference，唔好話係inmedia以外既地方，係呢度都早已前科纍纍。（佢自己都認。D人講過乜做過乜，網上留痕。）

況且話保護初學者，都要保護埋沉默地學習既google keyword者吧。佢次次大放完厥詞都有成村人同佢收拾，免得誤導新手，幾多labor hour呢你話。

Initially, I shared Ivy’s thought that I did not want to teach H how to do his paper. But his erroneous ideas really proliferated to an intolerable point.

“反正生在上中下三層的機會也是均等的”
This is obviously wrong. Empirically, I think in a global scale, one’s chance of being born into a poor family is much higher than into a rich family. Think about the hundreds of millions of poor peasants in China. Even in HK, the chance is still much higher, and it is increasingly higher now. And the difference between the rich and the poor could only be larger and the chance of being born poor higher under a pure free market system which H favours.

Moreover, the lottery of family background in a free market system is not the same as gambling on Mark Six, a favorite example of H. Its consequence is for whole life, and there is no second chance. Gamblers do not lose everything in one go and they often have second chance. When one has a really high chance of being poor for the whole life and their future generations being condemned forever in disadvantage due to a poor family background, one will agree with a social arrangement that if one lost in the lottery of family background, the consequence is still acceptable. Thus, this agreed system of lesser inequality, NOT ABSOLUTE EQUALITY (please don’t shift the focus of discussion, H), is "just" in the sense that everyone will agree with it if they do not know the outcome of the lottery, i.e., they do not know what family background they have. And logically, this system requires remedying the tendency of concentration of wealth in a few in a pure free market society so that the poor’s life is an acceptable one. Thus, redistribution of money and other social goods is required. Again, it does not imply redistribution to the point of ABSOLUTE EQUALITY.

Then, it comes to the question of what means by “acceptable”. Acceptableness is not something absolute, rather, it is relative. I hope H knows what is relative poverty. One’s feeling of being poor and the accompanying physical (e.g., hunger) as well as psychological (e.g., discrimination from H, lost of dignity and self-esteem) suffering is measured not by absolute amount of money and other kinds of social goods (e.g., leisure time, there is a limit for the conversion between money and leisure time: one cannot work 24 hours every day) one has, but the relative amount of money and other kinds of social goods. (Not to mention that the relative amount of money rather than the absolute amount of money determines one’s purchasing power and the “utility”obtained from these purchases.) When every child did not have toys in the past, no one felt poor and embarrassed. But when some children have toys, others who don’t have would feel poor. Thus, the minimum amount of social goods distributed to the poor is a relative amount rather than an absolute amount. When a society becomes more wealthy, this minimum amount of social goods also increase beyond the point of mere physical existence. Some enjoyments should be included, which will not be to the same level of the rich after all. The actual minimum amount thus differs across time and societies. Of course H does not like something relative, because he likes something absolute, or so-called “objective”.

H: “因此社會就要通過資源分配﹐讓所有人在同一的起步點開始競爭”

Redistribution is implied in such just social system, but it does not mean absolute equality, thus not “THE SAME” starting point.

**LESS INEQUALITY does not mean THE SAME. Redistribution is not about making the starting point of everyone THE SAME, although it may involve some uplifting of the starting point of the poor, but not to the SAME level of the rich. Hope H can understand this simple logic this time. These are the hinge points of his arguments. These hinge points cannot stand and thus his whole argument cannot stand.
For example, this is a point that cannot stand: “可是對於一些嚴重殘障或弱智人士﹐不論投放多少資源他們也不可能公平競爭。基於不同定律的公平原則下﹐我們要把資源無限地掉入沒有回報黑洞﹐最終只會導至均貧。”

After clarifying the rationale of this distributive justice based on choosing a system that can reduce the inequality, H’s endless confusing points can be eliminated. These other points of H can be considered as either irrelevant or the “price” (not merely money) that have to be paid for justice. Every system will have some good consequences and some bad ones.

H: “命生得好有運氣成份﹐可是成功也要靠運氣。一個出身寒微﹐天資平平的人﹐可以因為後天的努力和機緣巧合﹐成為一個坐擁巨大資源成功的人士﹐在起點公平下﹐他沒有理由要把資源分給其他人﹐所以不同定律就不成立。若一個人可以靠後天的好運氣﹐那不可以靠先天的好運氣就是不公平了。若果要把後天的好運氣的因素也除去﹐一來是實際上不可能做到﹐若要硬實行那人就會變得和機械人就沒有分別﹐所有事情也是整定。”

H: “在起點公平下﹐他沒有理由要把資源分給其他人”
Firstly, under the framework of distributive justice, the REASON of redistribution is that everyone will agree that the poor should have an acceptable level of life. The REASON is not the fairness or not of the starting point. The unfairness of the starting point is only used to refute the claim that one “deserves” the money one earns, not to support the choosing of a redistribution system.

**Conversely, it is H who has no REASON against redistribution of resources, because his argument of gamblers’ mentality is unable to overturn the idea that “an acceptable level of living standard for the poor” is what people will choose as a just social system, as I have argued in the beginning.

H: “若一個人可以靠後天的好運氣﹐那不可以靠先天的好運氣就是不公平了。若果要把後天的好運氣的因素也除去﹐一來是實際上不可能做到﹐若要硬實行那人就會變得和機械人就沒有分別﹐所有事情也是整定。”
Under a social system of distributive justice, some of the wealth of the rich should be redistributed, whether it is obtained due to good luck or not. As we are not talking about removing the good luck but just redistributing the wealth (which may or may not be due to good luck), there is no question of the practicality of removing good luck. But there are a lot of practical ways to redistribute social goods.

H: “其次就是不同定律沒有指明資源要代代清﹐若一個父母通過自身的努力﹐他們有權決定如何去使用賺取或分配到的資源。”

Again, a social system of redistribution does not ask for removing one’s family resources, it’s only about redistributing resources from the rich to the poor. Whether parents have full rights to the wealth they accumulated is debatable [this is where the argument of luck becomes relevant], but once a social system of redistribution is proved to be just because the majority of people will not risk their whole and only life for a very small chance of being rich, the price to be paid is that one should (perhaps unwillingly) agree to redistribute his resources.

H often mixed up the questions of “should” and “willingness”. The former is about justice and thus morality, while the latter is not about justice and morality. In other words, the fact that the rich may not be willing to redistribute their resources does not make redistribution unjust. Simply speaking, “justice” is not defined by “willingness”. In common sense, it may seem that forcing one to do something one is unwilling to do is unjust. But it is not always the case. Simply, a criminal may not be willing to be locked up, but we would not consider locking up a criminal unjust.

H: “最後就是養懶人的問題”

As we are not talking about ABSOLUTE EQUALITY, there is still incentive for people to work. One can still earn more by working hard. Even if there is any loss in efficiency (which is again debatable), this is the price to be paid for a just society. After all, human societies as a whole are already wealthy enough and can afford not to worry so much about efficiency, not to mention survival. The suffering of humanity is due more to unequal distribution rather than inadequate efficiency.

Besides, how can we eliminate those rich people who are lazy? Isn’t H contradicting his idea of incentive for efficiency by allowing parents to pass their wealth to their children? What is the incentive for these children to work hard then? (I do not agree with this argument of incentive and efficiency, but just want to point out the incoherence of H's “theory of efficiency” with his idea about right of inheritance.)

H, you can hold on to your immoral selfish thinking about efficiency, because you have freedom of expression, but just don’t call it JUST or FAIR. You are abusing these words.

(With typo and grammatical revision)

「你對自由主義的片面詮譯﹐只許讚不許彈」
「說自由主義等同公義化身」

H:
“// This is obviously wrong. Empirically ... //

We can just ignore this whole paragraph form the word "empirically". Remember, original position is behind the veil of ignorance. Maximize the weighted average with a constraint on limiting the population in the below average group is a logical conclusion.”

My reply:
“Veil of ignorance” does not require no knowledge at all. It just requires the absence of knowledge regarding one’s social background and abilities. Knowledge of the chance of winning in the lottery of social background does not need to be excluded, just as knowledge of risk-taking is not excluded. The trick of “word eating” by just spotting one or two words of others just reflects laziness in thinking.

H:
“// When one has a really high chance of being poor for the whole life and their future generations being condemned forever in disadvantage due to a poor family background //

What about the successful stories of poor kid become rich man? We have lots of examples in HK.”

My reply:
The chance of success is much lower for people of poor background, particularly with the tendency of increasing concentration of wealth in a free market system. The chance of success for the poor will just be smaller and smaller in such a free market system.
H contradicts himself by saying that parents should not be deprived of the right to pass their wealth to their children, while arguing that wealth passing to children has no effect on children’s life chance.

H:
“// Thus, redistribution of money and other social goods is required. Again, it does not imply redistribution to the point of ABSOLUTE EQUALITY. //

Hold on, I didn't say redistribution is unncessary. I am just saying we should miminize the redistribution to minimum tolerable level.

// Then, it comes to the question of what means by “acceptable”. Acceptableness is not something absolute, rather, it is relative. //

Using relative distrubtion is self defeating and illogical. Everyone want to be above the average, yet statistically it is impossible for everyone to be above average. Therefore, we can only rely on objective absolute amount of living standard.”

My comment:
How can H equate relatively acceptable level of living standard with “above average” level of living standard? And “acceptable” is not the same as what one “wants”. Don’t try to jump to the conclusion so quick.

H:
“// **LESS INEQUALITY does not mean THE SAME. //

How less is less inequality? Progresive tax code is less inequality. 9 years free education is less inequality. Social welfare is less inequality. Now, why are they asking for more?”

// the REASON of redistribution is that everyone will agree that the poor should have an acceptable level of life. The REASON is not the fairness or not of the starting point. The unfairness of the starting point is only used to refute the claim that one “deserves” the money one earns, not to support the choosing of a redistribution system. //

I DO agree the poor should have a minimium tolerable level of life. However, just having a acceptable level of life is far from the distribution of difference principle. I am attacking the difference principle all along, I am not attacking redistribution per se.”

My comment:
H actually means less than less. He argues for a level of mere physical existence, without any little enjoyment (what he called “tolerable”, I hope he can tolerate this kind of life). And he actually argues for widening the inequality, by forced removal of poor people from where they are living. Are we seeing increasing inequality or not? Poor people are not asking for a larger share, but just not an increasingly smaller share.

H:
// Under a social system of distributive justice, some of the wealth of the rich should be redistributed, whether it is obtained due to good luck or not. As we are not talking about removing the good luck but just redistributing the wealth (which may or may not be due to good luck), there is no question of the practicality of removing good luck. But there are a lot of practical ways to redistribute social goods. //

If removing wealth not due to good luck (that is wealth due to hard work or choose of life style), then it will violiate Rawl's first principle. Rawl's whole theory is based on wealth by chance is unjust, he didn't say wealth due to hard work is unjust.

My comment:
I actually didn’t mention “Rawls” in this previous message as I don’t want to involve in interpreting Rawls. I am interested only in the moral basis of redistribution. Simply speaking, the justice of redistribution does not depend on whether the wealth redistributed is from hard work or good luck. It depends on people’s agreeing with the arrangement of redistribution to secure an “acceptable” standard of living for the poor.

H:
“// the majority of people will not risk their whole and only life for a very small chance of being rich the price to be paid is that one should (perhaps unwillingly) agree to redistribute his resources.//

Not true. If the chance of getting rich is 1:100, but the distribution of wealth between poor to rich is 1:200. You are better off to taking that chance logically speaking. Remember, in Rawl's original principle, he assume everyone is rational, so people will choose the distribution with better weighted average.”

My comment:
Again, H’s conclusion comes from his idea that everything can be quantified. The distribution of social goods does not only limit to monetary wealth and many of these social goods cannot be quantified. Thus, it is a choice between an acceptable life and a very rich life. The chance of the latter is extremely low. And I guess H must know what is diminishing marginal utility: when one has an acceptable life, the additional wealth or social goods do not increase the “utility” or “happiness” much, at least not proportional to the amount increased. To simplify the argument, when $1 can give an acceptable life, $200 will not give a 200 times of happiness as the $1 can give.

And remember, we are not talking about absolute equality after redistribution. People agreeing to a social system of redistribution will still have the chance of born into a rich family, although the difference between the poor and the rich would not be that big as in a pure free market system. In other words, the rich in a system of pure free market may have more wealth than the rich in a system of redistribution, but the difference may not give much difference in actual utility. A rational person should choose to secure an acceptable level of life before participating in a lottery of family background to get more, rather than choosing a system with no such guarantee in the first place. Again, this is not a Mark Six lottery, and there could be very little chance to leave the poverty if one lost in a lottery of family background with a free market system as the agreed social arrangement.

I could sense that H is actually forced (by his conscience?) to accept a certain level of living standard for the poor through redistribution, so he is contradicting himself by arguing that people will not choose this system of redistribution because of their gamblers’ mentality.

Actually, what he argues is that this level should be at a level only enough for physical existence, and I have already argued in the previous message that poverty is not only a physical matter, but also a psychological one. As a result of poverty as a relative concept, this means that the increasing wealth of the rich has to be accompanied by increasing wealth of the poor so that the poor will have an acceptable level of living. That's the maximin principle.

The other comments by H are piecemeal, repeating the wrong assumption of redistribution as the equivalence of absolute equality, or irrelevant for the justification or refutation of a system of redistribution.