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Third Discourse on Revenge: On the Right to Harm (Revised Version)

It is a pleasure to write to readers of this Forum quietly at night, after a day of reading, thinking and, alas! responding. It is a pleasure jealously guarded, especially by a writer who loves to write autistically. What a long debate a single phrase has sparked off! There is something in the phrase which, I surmise, does not quite fit the air of this Forum, regardless of the reader's own moral persuasion. Had I written a sentence like "Forgiveness softens the heart in a cruel world of hatred, like the gentle breeze of spring, refreshes a blood-soaked earth"; or one like "Humanity seeks justice but not revenge; we do not hate our enemies, but demand only a just redress of their past wrong"; I would, if fortunate, have received a standing ovation, many concurring comments, and a full five-mark evaluation. Quietly I must ask myself: Why do I not write those sentences, even poetry, a sonnet of love, an ode to mercy, against which I hold no grudge at all? A victim demanding the court to do justice, and justice done, and the world at peace once again: A noble ideal indeed. Can any man ever rise against such an ideal? -

But cruelly I look at the victim. What does it mean, Victim, to demand the court to do justice? - To rule in accordance with the law. - With what result? - The wrong-doer punished. - Do you expect this result? - Yes, I do. - You mean, when you plead in the court, in accordance with the law, you expect that the wrong-doer will be punished? - Indeed. - And punishment inflicts pain? - Surely. - And you expect that the court will in accordance with the law inflict pain on the wrong-doer? - Certainly. - You mean, you expect the wrong-doer to feel painful? - Yes, I expect him to feel painful. - That is, harmed? - Yes, harmed. - You expect the wrong-doer to be harmed when you demand the court to do justice? - I do. - To do justice means to harm the wrong-doer in accordance with the law? - Of course. - What gives the law this power to harm? - It is just to harm the wrong-doer, and that is the whole point. - But why? - By virtue of the law. - But why does the law have such power? - Because it is just. - That is circular, Victim. - Then I must say, because the law is agreed upon by the community. - But why does the community have such power, the power to punish the wrong-doer? - Certainly the community does not want to indulge wrong-doers! - Sure. But can you imagine that while the community as a whole can punish the wrong-doer, you yourself as the victim cannot? - I cannot, I must resort to the law. - That is not what I mean. I mean if no member of the community has any power to punish a wrong-doer justifiably, can the community then have such a power? - I do not think so. - Right. But then, you mean you must at some point have a power to punish? - Not legally. - Not legally. But you must at some point be entitled to punish, I mean, justified to punish. - I think if someone wrongs me severely, I can rightly punish him. Now that the community had resolved to do this collectively, I cannot. - Right. But then, you must at some point have the RIGHT to punish the wrong-doer. For you said you must at some point be justified to do so. - That is what I think. - What kind of right is it? - Not legal right. - Not legal right. For that right precedes the institution of the law. - A non-legal right then? -

How about a MORAL right. - I believe that even without the law, I can punish someone justifiably, morally justifiably, if that person has harmed me. - So it must be a moral right. - A moral right indeed. - And now you exercise that right through the court? - Yes. - But you said you have no LEGAL right to punish. - Very well, but I am entitled to ask the court to punish on my behalf. - So you have no LEGAL right to punish, but you have a LEGAL right to ask the court to punish. And that right comes from a prior MORAL right to punish. - Sure enough. - Have you relinquished your moral right to punish then? - I do not know. - You cannot, legally, punish the wrong-doer, but you are entitled to have the court punish him. - On that much we have agreed. - Are you entitled to have the wrong-doer punished, solely because the law declares so? - In a way yes. -  But who declared the law? - Human beings. - On what ground? - On moral ground. - Patently, the ground can only be moral. Now, Victim, does the declaration of the law nullify the moral ground then? - What do you mean? - I mean, does the declaration of the law render the moral ground no longer available? - It is a difficult question. I have no LEGAL right to punish; but do I still have a MORAL right to punish? - Wonderful. And here is the rub: If upon the institution of the law you have given up every moral right to sanction the crime, and the law happens to be too lenient, what ground would you have for making the law harsher? - Moral ground of course. - But you have already given up every moral right to sanction the crime. You can do only so much as the law now permits you to do through the court. - But the law is of man's making. I can certainly with the consent of the community change it. - Fair enough. But on what ground? - On moral ground. I have said it in so many words. - But that means that the law cannot be the ULTIMATE ground on which a crime is punished. - The law itself is grounded on morality. - Fair enough. And so you must, even after the institution of the law, be able to retain the MORAL right to punish. - That must be the case. -  A moral right to punish. - A moral right to punish. -

To punish the wrong-doer? - To punish the wrong-doer. - To harm him? - To harm him. - In a justified way? - Fully justified. - Do you call this rightful revenge? - Well, no. Not revenge, but justice. - So justice means you have the right to ask the court to HARM the wrong-doer? - Yes. But rightfully. - Very well. I do not insist that you call it rightful revenge. But justice, as you see, does involve this element of a right of the victim, perhaps indirectly, to harm the wrong-doer. - And the right is a LEGAL right? - A legal right. - But a legal right based ultimately on a MORAL right. - Indeed so. - Which you retain even after the institution of the law. - I must say that is correct. - Very well. I think that is all I want to make clear. ... ...

Should it be annoying that justice involves a right to harm (the wrong-doer)? Whatever the answer, I must say, the right remains; unless one is to mean by justice something drastically different. But if the right to harm is patently an element of justice, can this same right be equalled with the right to revenge? It depends on whether one feels bound to explicate the word "revenge" in such a way that it is clearly distinguished from the moral and psychological make-up behind the act of rightfully harming another person - the wrong-doer. Reader, if you cannot accept that the right to harm, in this case, is the same as the right to revenge, I rest my case satisfactorily so far as you acknowledge that justice involves that right to harm. For the present writer, the right to revenge, when appropriately interpreted, means neither more nor less than a right to harm. But if you think that even this last phrase sounds too bloody, or in any other way fits not your delicate taste, I must allow reality likewise to rest content, beyond the reach of your fancy, lest the sword of Justice profane the sonnet and the ode, in the gentle night of merry discoursing  ... Y.T. Sept. 13, 2006 Cambridge, MA